Discontented geopolitics of other European spaces by Boedeltje, Freerk
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland 
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
isbn 978-952-61-0489-8
issn 1798-5749
Freerk Boedeltje
Discontented Geopolitics 
of Other European Spaces 
This dissertation contributes to a 
better understanding of the changing 
concept of the European Union’s 
external borders in the 21st century 
and the geopolitical and symbolic 
implications that are taking place on 
both the supranational arena, and 
on the more local level of everyday 
life. With the continuing fluctuation 
of European bordering practices, it is 
important to scrutinise the extent to 
which, security-issues, symbolic and 
geopolitical actions are emerging at 
and beyond the external borders, and 
what their implications are for the 
people involved.
d
issertatio
n
s | N
o
 24 | F
reerk
 B
o
ed
eltje  | D
iscon
ten
ted
 G
eop
olitics of O
th
er E
u
rop
ea
n
 S
p
a
ces
Freerk Boedeltje
Discontented Geopolitics
of Other European Spaces
Discontented Geopolitics 
of Other European Spaces 
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies No 24
FREERK BOEDELTJE
Discontented Geopolitics 
of Other European Spaces 
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
No 24
Itä-Suomen yliopisto
Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja kauppatieteiden tiedekunta
Joensuu
2011
Kopijyvä Oy, Joensuu
Joensuu 2011
Editor: FT Kimmo Katajala
Sales: University of Eastern Finland Library 
ISBN (nid.): 978-952-61-0489-8
ISSN (nid.): 1798-5749
ISSNL: 1798-5749
ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-0490-4
ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757
Author: Boedeltje, Freerk
“Discontented Geopolitics: of Other European Spaces 90 p.
University of Eastern Finland
Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies, 2011
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland, 
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies, no 24
ISBN (print.): 978-952-61-0489-8
ISSN (print.): 1798-5749
ISSNL: 1798-5749
ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-0490-4
ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757
Dissertation
ABSTRACT
The European Union claims in its speeches, documents and its latest foreign policy 
program that a feeling of belonging to the European Union is possible. Moreover, it 
claims that there are indications of a European identity. This discourse of European 
identity is especially embodied in the belief in ‘Europeanization’ which refers to the 
transportation of European values beyond the formal borders of the European Union. 
I argue that current hegemonic visions of Europe, based on a dubious mix of differ-
ent connotations of Europe and the misleading distinction between the metaphors 
Europe and the European Union (EU), turns out to be problematic and result in what 
I would subsequently call Europe’s discontented geopolitics. In confusion, Europe is 
presented as a homogeneous thing-in-itself with the ideal of one name (Europe), one 
website (Europa.eu), a capital (Brussels), one market, one currency (euro), one identity 
that is characterized by diversity and,  one external border. 
In the grey and rather fuzzy zone between Europe and the European Union the 
fabrication of a limited version of Europe leads to new processes of (spatial) inclusion 
and exclusion. I argue that Europe is increasingly losing its historically voluntary 
and open meaning, and instead aiming to become a spatially defined EU-topia with 
membership, values and citizenship. In many occasions these ideal imaginations as 
scripted by the EU do not match the complex local realities and every day lives across 
Europe. In order to theorize the gap between the prevalent normative discourse and 
the contradicting local realities I use Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopias. I will 
search for places that disturb the utopian image and will follow the several principles 
that define heterotopias, not by simply reflecting on its possible meanings but by 
discussing the principles of resistance to the level of real places in the EU and in its 
neighbourhood. Heterotopias are the ‘other’ spaces of Europe that do not represent 
one single place, but also incorporate complex processes in which difference or al-
ternative spaces unfold. In this, the overall questions stands strong: Can Europe and 
the EU remain two separate concepts. Can Europe keep up with its promise of de-
mocracy, stability and dialogue? These are the central questions in this dissertation. 
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Väitöskirja 
ABSTRAKTI
Puheita, asiakirjoja ja uusimpia ulkopoliittisia ohjelmia lukiessa Euroopan unioni 
vakuuttaa, että Euroopan unioniin kuulumisen tunne on mahdollista. Se vakuuttaa, 
että on olemassa merkkejä eurooppalaisesta identiteetistä. Tämä eurooppalaiseen 
identiteettiin liittyvä diskurssi ilmentää tiettyä uskoa ”eurooppalaistumiseen”, mikä 
viittaa eurooppalaisten arvojen siirtymiseen EU:n muodollisten rajojen yli. Väitän, 
että hegemoniset näkökulmat nykypäivän Eurooppassa, jotka perustuvat kyseen-
alaiseen sekoitukseen Euroopan sivumerkityksistä ja harhaanjohtaviin Eurooppaa 
ja Euroopan unionia käsitteleviin metaforiin, osoittautuvat ongelmalliseksi ja johta-
vat siihen mitä tutkimuksessani kutsun Euroopan tyytymättömyyden geopolitiikaksi. 
Hämmennyksen tilassa Eurooppa esitetään näennäisesti homogeenisena ja itses-
tään olemassa olevana kokonaisuutena, jolla on idealistisesti yksi nimi (Eurooppa), 
yksi Internet-kotisivu (Europa.eu), pääkaupunki (Bryssel), yhdet markkinat, yksi raha 
(euro), yksi monimuotoisuuteen perustuva identiteetti ja yksi ulkoraja.
Harmaalla ja varsin epämääräisellä Euroopan ja Euroopan unionin välisellä alu-
eella rajallisen Euroopan tuottaminen johtaa uusiin sisällyttämisen ja poissulkemi-
sen (tilallisen) prosesseihin. Väitän, että Eurooppa menettää kasvavassa määrin his-
toriallisesti vapaaehtoista ja avointa merkitystään ja että siitä on  tulossa tilallisesti 
määritetty EU-topia, jolla on oma jäsenyys, omat arvot ja kansalaisuus. Monesti nämä 
tiettyihin ihanteisiin perustuvat ja EU:n rakentamat mielikuvat eivät kuitenkaan vas-
taa sen enempää paikallista todellisuutta kuin elämääkään eripuolilla Eurooppaa.. 
Tarkastellakseni normatiivia diskursseja ja ristiriitaisten paikallisten todellisuuksi-
en kuilua teoreettisesti, käytän tutkimuksessa Michel Foucaultin käsitettä heterotopia. 
Tarkastelen utopistisia mielikuvia häiritseviä paikkoja ja seuraan useita heterotopiaa 
määritteleviä periaatteita. En kuitenkaan käsittele vain käsitteen mahdollisia merki-
tyksiä vaan pohdin vastustuksen sääntöjä todellisten paikkojen tasolla EU:ssa ja sen 
lähialueilla. Heterotopiat ovat Euroopan ”toisia” tiloja, jotka eivät edusta yhtä tiettyä 
paikkaa vaan sisältävät monimutkaisia  prosesseja, joissa erilaisuus tai vaihtoehtoiset 
tilat kehittyvät. Tässä yleiset kysymykset ovat keskeisiä: Voivatko Eurooppa ja EU py-
syä eri käsitteinä? Voiko Eurooppa pysyä mukana demokratiaan, vakauteen ja dialo-
giin liittyvissä lupauksissaan? Nämä ovat väitöskirjani keskeisiä kysymyksiä.
Avainsanat: Eurooppa, kriittinen geopolitiikka, Euroopan unioni, identiteetti, geo-
politiikka
Foreword
I would like to start this dissertation with a personal note. I guess right from the 
start of my studies in geography I have been interested in writing on Europe. But 
when thinking back, the interest started much earlier. I remember that I was truly 
fascinated by Europe when I was attending high school. Actually, it was the main 
reason for me for studying geography. The excitement about Europe was not so much 
something particular, but, I think, the immense idea of openness, possibility and an 
innumerable amount of impressions, feelings and sightings that came to me during 
holidays, and also reflected in music, film and books. In a sense I felt a bit like German 
filmmaker Wim Wenders. He expressed: ‘I was relieved as a kid to realize that I 
could be something other than German. I realized there was a different definition 
for somebody like me, a German coming out of the war. This idea of being European 
came without all the pitfalls of nationalism. So I’ve been an ardent European since I 
was 10 years old! I loved the idea of Europe, because it freed me from the burden of 
belonging to a nation, something I never wanted’.
I very much, share this feeling. And up to today my passion for Europe has not 
changed over the years, what changed, however, seems the idea of Europe. Today, the 
idea of Europe itself has become an important subject in political explanations. And 
where once Europe was able to free me ‘from the burden of belonging to a nation’ 
in providing a meaningful idea, it seems now increasingly promoted as a nation, a 
European institution with banalities such as a flag and anthem, a particular place to 
which European citizens can belong and not-belong. Not only as a political geogra-
pher, but also because of that lively memory in me, I felt too much has been claimed 
for ‘my own private Europe’. This was for me the main motivation for writing this 
dissertation, for I would defend that Europe is always more than any definite vision 
or claim. So, is it written out of anger? No, I would say, it is written out of a deep con-
cern with an idea that that means much to me.
At the final stage of my search for what is left of ‘the open idea of Europe’ I am 
happy to say that my own private idea about Europe is much in tact, not in the last place 
because of the pleasant people I was lucky to work with. I would like to thank Ruben 
and Roald for support and company during my years in Nijmegen. I am also grateful 
to James and Paul, who made it possible for continuing my exploration of Europe in 
Joensuu and for the interest in my work, the discussions and the useful help in the pro-
cess of writing. Thanks to James D. Sidaway for suggesting the strong title, the drinks 
and talks at CREA Amsterdam and for being one of the examiners of the final work. I 
also would like to thank Anssi Paasi for his inspiration, thoughtful insights: it is a real 
honour to have you as examiner of my work. Finally, I would like to thank the Karelian 
Institute and especially Joni and Ilkka for granting me a doctoral position at the Russia 
in Europe Graduate School. The last words I leave to someone where words fall short. 
Henk: All this writing would not have been there without you. You are not only an 
inspiring colleague but after all as true soul mate. It is to you I dedicate this book. 
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1 General Introduction 
‘Europe as ideal (let us call it ‘Europeanism’) defies monopolistic ownership. It cannot 
be denied to the ‘other’, since it incorporates the phenomenon of ‘otherness: in practice 
of Europeanism, the perpetual effort to separate, expel and externalize is constantly 
thwarted by the drawing in, admission, accommodation and assimilation of the ‘ex-
ternal”’ (Zygmunt Bauman, 2004, Europe an unfinished adventure)
1.1 THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY
The raison d'être of this dissertation must be seen in the light of current geopolitical 
transitions that are taking place in Europe and its expanding spheres on the con-
tinent. These expanding spheres have been conceptualised as ‘wider Europe’ and 
by the European Union specified as a neighbourhood that 'invites our neighbours 
to the East and to the South to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that we 
enjoy in the European Union and which aims to create a ring of friends around the 
external borders of the European Union' (COM, 2003, 393 final). Moreover, the EU 
regards these new incentives as 'sharing the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement 
with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for 
all concerned' (ibid). 
European Union policies linked to ‘wider Europe’ as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) have materialised not only as a response to the continuing territorial and 
geopolitical expansion over the past decades, but also as a result of the development 
of the EU towards a political community. These policies have one overarching objec-
tive; namely the role in contributing to stability in multilevel context. Stability here 
is defined in terms of 'the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, 
including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the prin-
ciples of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development' (ibid). 
The promise of EU membership to the candidate member states in the past have 
turned out to be an influential policy instrument for transferring the EU’s model in 
its most fundamental sense, and in all fields from economics, politics, and society to 
identity, and which means sooner or later accepting the whole Acquis Communautaire 
(Emerson, 2002). The continuation of the EU enlargement process, however, is be-
lieved to be indefensible in the future, and if anything, the EU discourages long-term 
membership expectations with states that haven't been candidates (Emerson, 2002). 
In order to reimburse for potentially damaging consequences on stability and de-
velopment as well as any long-term forms of exclusion, the EU has introduced new 
geopolitical strategies in order to facilitate the geopolitical transitions along the new 
external borders of the European Union. These challenges have resulted in different 
initiatives for participation in EU activities, via increasing political, economic and 
cultural co-operation and different forms of regional and national assistance. These 
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procedures have been worked out in a new doctrine, which instead of concentrating 
on EU membership, aims at institutionalising and strengthening the existing geopo-
litical relations in a partnership, through shared values, common ideals and common 
goals, and ultimately replacing existing bilateral agreements. And with the launch of 
its new external relations policy in 2004 – The European Neighbourhood Policy – the 
European Union indeed entered a new stage in its history. The focus was no longer 
solely put on economic integration, but shifted with the introduction of this policy to 
a deeper European integration that moved beyond the formal structures of European 
Union membership. The European Neighbourhood Policy was designed to develop ‘a 
zone of economic prosperity and consequently a friendly neighbourhood with whom 
Europe enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations’ (COM 2003 104 final). This 
new policy meant a next step in formalizing the EU’s relations with its neighbouring 
countries and at the same time expanding its sphere of influence.
 External relations among EU countries with its neighbouring countries is not 
in itself new, but what is new with the introduction of the ENP is the coherent and 
direct way of influencing and structuring its sphere of influence. The ENP is centred 
on the belief that the EU neighbouring states can be ‘Europeanized’ (Europeanization 
according to the European Union entails the endorsement of particular European 
values like democracy, good governance, market economy, minority/human rights 
etc.). This is done by means of policies and practices in which neighbouring states can 
become ‘close’ partners but without the direct prospective of becoming EU member 
(at least in the near future). Following the enlargement of 2004 with ten new member 
States, it could have been perceived that the EU opened the door for further enlarge-
ment by introducing the ENP, but this move could also be simultaneously explained 
as an alternative for membership and thus keeping the confusing geographies of 
Africa, Middle-East and Russia at a distance. 
The choice to use the term ‘neighbourhood’ illustrates this seemingly fuzziness 
between the gradients of European integration. The conventional meaning of a neigh-
bour usually refers to someone who lives close by but belongs to a different family 
with slightly other values and habits. And because of the differences and nearness, 
neighbours are mostly kept at a psychological distance. The subsequent question that 
comes up is why most neighbours are characterised as those living in the house next 
door, behind a fence, hedge or other symbolic border. This characterization more or less 
indicates that the signification of the word neighbour contains an a-priori difference 
(between ‘us’ and ‘them’) for, ‘if and when one defines one’s neighbours, implicitly, one 
defines one’s borders’ (van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011, 121). In the case of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the neighbour seems more or less defined as those countries 
outside the structures of EU membership and those behind the EU external border, 
which raises the question of whether the neighbour is regarded as fully European or 
as not quite European. From this perspective, the term neighbour contradicts with the 
highly regarded premises of equality and co-ownership (highly regarded by the EU 
according to its documents). Moreover, by referring to other countries in terms of one’s 
own neighbourhood without specifying the names of the countries indicates that the 
new policy seemingly has a largely unilateral origin and interest. 
Likewise, this is emphasized by the fact that neighbours are referred to without 
the connotation ‘European’. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy suggests 
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a certain Europeanness of its neighbours, the quotes from ENP documents refer to 
the neighbours of Europe. The absence of the use ‘European’ neighbourhood seems 
not only at odds in the context of the confusion between Europe and the EU but also 
separating various areas from Europeanness. Kostadinova, (2009, 246) has in similar 
terms pointed out that ‘the inclusion of the eastern neighbours in the same policy 
framework as the Southern Mediterranean states may indicate that the former, just 
as the latter, should not be considered European’. Therefore, the first motives behind 
the ENP seem to indicate that being European involves a certain nearness, recogni-
tion and empathy based on particular values and a common historical background. 
Not considering neighbours a-priori, Europe involves the practice of distancing and 
‘othering’ as an obligation of membership, European integration, citizenship, or other 
grants are linked with Europeanness do not automatically apply. Seen in this light, 
for the first time since its existence, the EU pre-defined in clear language its external 
relations and subsequently defined its (symbolic) borders.
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Consequently, as wider Europe and the European Neighbourhood Policy is getting 
its shape, and becoming most notably the important issue on the EU’s external pol-
icy agenda for the coming years, the overall implication of the new EU geopolitical 
agenda remain ambiguous--not only on interstate relations and the ability to pro-
gress its own foreign policy capacities but also in defining a geographically restrictive 
notion of European space. The geopolitical ambiguity as reflected in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy echoes the current discussion of what (wider) Europe today 
is or should be. This seems to count even more in the situation where the EU seems 
to present itself as a state-like institution in which polarities such as European –Non 
European, the EU and its neighbours and the confusion between Europe and the EU 
increasingly lead to political implications. 
As a result, the question remains as to how on-going institutional and perceptual 
changes that approve closer political relations with neighbouring countries can take 
place despite simultaneous and selective processes of inclusion and exclusion (Scott, 
2005). What are the implications and difficulties of this paradox for communities, 
states and institutions within and beyond the borders of the European Union? The 
implications of this paradox is particularly represented in two divergent imaginary 
visions on Europe: When looking at the first, it is important to remark that the cur-
rent political confusion of the status of ‘wider Europe’ is inherent to the confusion 
between Europe and the European Union, which as Annemarie Pieper (1996, 183, 186) 
remarks, was and still is an ideal imagination. She uses the word utopia in which she 
argues that utopia today has a rather negative connotation. She explains that when 
a project is considered utopian, it means that although interesting, it is normally re-
jected on grounds of being unrealistic if not a phantasm that must be shared under 
fiction (she uses the words ‘dream word’ or imaginary world). The word utopian 
seems therefore not related to a realistic or at least realizable empirical reality. In case 
of the European Union, the idealistic vision is represented by the homogeneous image 
of a stable and good Europe surrounded by neighbouring countries that are friendly 
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to Europe and share the same values. This is what I would like to call EU-topia: the 
gradual process where representatives of the institutionalized EU put forward new 
forms of social spatialization (ideas of a certain version of Europe) and spatial sociali-
zation (the construction of a European ‘we’ via the use of identity narratives and other 
symbols that are mediated to citizens). In the next chapters I will further outline the 
particular meaning of EU-topia.  
The rather opposite is to be found in the second heterogeneous vision of Europe 
as represented by heterotopias. In the subsequent section on heterotopias we will 
learn from Michel Foucault that heterotopias are disturbing places that from below 
confront utopias with their impossibilities. The heterogeneous heterotopias can be 
understood as something that undermines the utopian homogeneous imaginations, 
as a disturbance, or in other words as resistance in which they resist the idealistic 
picture. This dissertation takes the principles of utopia and heterotopia as guideline 
in the search for ‘other spaces of Europe’ that resist the hegemonic vision of Europe. 
The examples of hegemonic utopias and heterotopias provide an overview of the 
geopolitical visions of Europe in their own particular way. Whereas the first uto-
pian vision represents a clear visions of what Europe is or should be (represented in 
the map of the EU and its neighbourhood as shown on the ENP website), the latter 
geographies of resistance are complex, vibrant and resists the static meaning of geo-
graphical determinists. 
 By looking with the critical geopolitical eye, this dissertation aims to contribute 
to a better understanding of the changing concept of Europe and its borders and the 
political, societal and symbolic transitions that have taken place. With the fluctua-
tion of the European Union border zones, it is important to scrutinise the extent to 
which structures of bordering practices, security issues and symbolic and political 
action are emerging at the borders of the European Union, and what their implica-
tions are for the people involved. With this dissertation I will reflect on the EU’s ex-
ternal policy and its borders not so much on an empirical level, but by trying to look 
beyond the policies and rationales to its ‘nature’ and ‘ethics’ and how the European 
Neighbourhood Policy acts as an vehicle to transport ‘European values’ beyond the 
formal border of the EU. The research executes this analysis by exploring political dis-
courses, societal and political perceptions and representations, the context in which 
they operate and the position of the EU in shaping its relations within 'wider Europe'. 
The geopolitical transitions within the European Neighbourhood Policy will there-
fore be investigated and based on one central question:
•  Can the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU live up to its promise of con-
tributing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe?  
For the purpose of the dissertation, the central question will be scrutinised in terms 
of four themes:
1. The emergence of a European Union geopolitical framework: What is its geopo-
litical vision in relation to its external borders and the construction of a wider 
European neighbourhood?
2. Judging concrete policies of the European Union by assessing the impact of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Action Plans.  
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3. What are the impacts of the EU's notion of Europeanization towards wider 
Europe and how are these reflected and perceived in everyday realities? 
4. Highlighting transitions in political discourse and symbolic representations 
with respect to the EU’s emerging geopolitical notions, including issues like 
partnership versus membership, and ideas about stability and democracy in the 
context of securitisation on the one hand and dialogue/cooperation on the other. 
1.3 EXPECTED OUTCOMES
The expected outcome draws on two major debates: (1) Should we indeed draw on 
the assumption that the transition of Europe and its borderlands is heading towards a 
new European entity of overlapping sovereignties, multiple decision making centres 
and multiple layers of scale and therefore a new economic, political and social author-
ity aiming at exclusion/inclusion of “wider Europe”? (2) Or are the current transitions 
of European borders more an indication of a neo-liberal global capitalist epoch driven 
by national economies of scale that has neo-colonial aspirations and thus aiming at 
forms of exclusion and exploitative relations?
The critical approach of the research is expected to contribute to the state of the 
art on both theoretical and empirical grounds in the following ways: (1) Document 
the evolution of EU policies and strategies towards the external borders and “wider 
Europe”; (2) Focus on the political and socio-economic impacts of the enlargement 
process: (3) Synthesise and complement the existing literature on the EU’s present 
external borders. 
This is done by researching the contradictions within ‘wider Europe’ that could 
result from tensions between official EU policies and more pragmatic interaction 
processes on the one hand and real-time processes of inclusion and exclusion on the 
other. For example, processes of ‘securitisation’ and border-management and social-
political dialogue. The thesis studies the development of political language and the 
notion of what the EU and Europe means, in terms of dominant discourses. This is 
and remains a difficult topic with regard to ‘wider Europe’. Furthermore, the thesis 
analyses how the EU and EU policies and practices impact on regional interaction and 
development for communities, enterprises and political actors and, finally research 
how the idea of shared European values affects regional neighbourhood cooperation. 
Does the EU acquis contribute to a politics of difference with regard to non EU Europe 
and its neighbourhood which could lead to exclusion? These questions contribute to 
the general output of the thesis, in terms of scientific articles.
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
As such, this dissertation is devoted to a critical scrutiny of the representation of 
Europe and its borders. The research will reflect on the intrinsic geopolitical complex-
ity and multiplicity of various ways Europe is represented. As have been highlighted 
in the introduction, there are complex realities in Europe that unfold the contra-
dictions and intentions of the political imaginations as reflected in today’s ‘wider’ 
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Europe. Using the critical lens as a tool, this dissertation is shaped by different ana-
lytical methods in order to gain a thorough understanding of the temporal and spatial 
organisation, and the complex interaction, of economic, social, political and cultural 
processes (Kitchin and Tate, 1998). This research shares the idea of Lefebvre (1991) 
and Foucault (1967) that space is a fabricated and ever changing product shaped by 
representational practices of power relations. The state of the art of critical border 
studies indicates that in addition to geopolitical shifts, borders are being redefined 
through more immediate social practices and perceptions (see for example O’Dowd, 
2010 and Scott and van Houtum, 2009). The major conceptual shift in border studies 
lies in acknowledging that state borders are complex political institutions transecting 
social spaces not only in administrative but also in cultural, economic and functional 
terms (Scott, 2011). Central to this latter perspective are multiple interpretations of 
border significance, border-related elements of identity-formation, socio-cultural and 
experiential basis for border-defining processes, power relations in society and geo-
political orders, as well as critical analyses of geopolitical discourses.  
 Lefebvre’s ‘the production of Space’ points out that the production of ‘social space 
is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it sub-
sumes things produced and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence 
and simultaneity—their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 73). 
The introduction has also uncovered that space in the view of Foucault is never a neu-
tral place but the form of relations among places, in which the imagination of space 
is the form of subjective imaginations, not neutral or free: ‘social space is produced 
and reproduced in connection with the forces of production. (…) ‘forces (that) are not 
taking over a pre-existing, empty or neutral space, or a space determined solely by 
geography, climate, anthropology’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 72). Lefebvre has proposed the 
triad of social concepts as analysis of space in order to understand how complex so-
cial relations are constantly shaped and reshaped by subjective representations and 
practices (see figure 1). 
1.Spatial Practice – ‘In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society’s 
relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a 
specific level of performance’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 33). 
2. Representations of space – refer to spaces that ‘are tied to the relations of produc-
tion and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, 
to codes, and to ‘frontal’ relations’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 33). Also to: ‘conceptualized space, 
the space of scientists, planners, urbanist, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, 
as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of whom identify what s lived and 
what is perceived with what is conceived’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 38).
3. Representational space – Spaces that ‘lived' directly “through its associated images 
and symbols and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’…’’ (Lefebvre, 1991, 39).
Figure 1: Triad of social relations
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The three moments of the triad, perceived, conceived, and lived, must be understood 
through their inter-subjective relationships. The triad contributes to the fabrication of 
space in different combinations according to the mode of production and the histori-
cal time frame. It is important to note that the relations between the three moments 
are never simple or stable, nor are they entirely conscious. In addition, they appear 
in constant shifting relations allowing for multiple interpretations and meanings and 
also to the production of new meanings (Peet, 1998, 104). According to Lefebvre ‘the 
reproduction of the social relations of production within this space inevitably obeys 
two tendencies: the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the generation 
of new relations on the other. Thus, despite—or rather because of—its negativity, ab-
stract space carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall call that new 
space “differential space”, because, inasmuch as abstract space tends towards homo-
geneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, a new space 
cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences’. (Lefebvre, 1991, 52).
 The traditional geopolitical features of territoriality as described in traditional 
geopolitics collide with the idea of representational spaces, In order to come to terms 
with the diversity of meaning the empirical analysis of this research will focus on 
policies/discourse, perceptions and practices and fieldwork. Policies/discourse are 
given in by spatial action and supported by public opinion. Perceptions do not rely 
on action as such, for the reason that they are not limited or excluded by borders. It 
is therefore likely that perceptions both support and undermine policies and inform 
practices. Practices relate to the most part to policies and discourse and shape the ac-
tual space though activities. Furthermore, policies, practices and perceptions will be 
scrutinised from different spatial levels: the European (EUtopia) and the sub-national 
(Heterotopia). This will allow a description and explanation of the difficulties of spe-
cific areas. The next section further elaborates on the research framework. 
Policies/discourse: are characterized by official political bodies and supported by 
dominant norms and values that govern European Union external relations and give 
direction to various policies by defining programs, Action Plans as well as the pre-
conditions for membership. The importance concerning the EU's external relations 
policies are first and foremost embedded in the fabrication of the European Union as 
political entity (which started with the Schumann declaration, the Maastricht treaty, 
Copenhagen European Council). Once the EU was constructed as it is today, par-
ticular documents further defined the political framework of the EU—most notably 
in this respect is the Schengen treaty. The last step in defining a European external 
policy, are the specific policies related to the external relations—most notably the 
COM and SEC documents on the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the Common Neighbourhood treaty with Russia and the de-
velopment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The construction of a 
European political entity with an official external relations policy is supported and 
informed by particular strong discourses of a shared common European history. 
These imaginations have been strengthened by the relative success of the European 
Union especially since the Delors administrations in the years preceding the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall. The idea of a makeable Europe with common roots can only be 
understood from selective historical interpretations that voice specific interest and 
bring forward concrete objectives. These particular imaginations in their turn are 
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communicated by political speeches to public opinion, media and civil society in 
order to support the prevalent picture. 
Perceptions/thought: Mentioned earlier, perceptions represent a certain freedom 
not restricted by borders and sheltered by representation. Perceptions are subjective 
and idealistic parts that influence the way in which the geopolitical position of bor-
ders is understood. Perceptions include visions on European borders in the context 
of EU integration not only at the level of the state but also by regions and ordinary 
people. Perceptions are under the influence of many societal elements including the 
official political discourse of a state or the EU, by public discussion, via (multi)media 
and within civil society, by societal opinions and historical sentiment or emotion. In 
addition, state-society concepts with respect to fear, populism and societal mobilisa-
tion are seen to play an important role in influencing policy decisions (see Scott, 2001).
Practices: relate to different forms of regionally specific activities that contribute 
to the construction of the European Union’s external relations. They are supported 
by the different policies and discourses and informed by thought. Practices construct 
and reconstruct Europe as well as its borders; and are the outcomes of cooperation/
partnership, the implementation of policies and informal interaction. Practices em-
body the actual translation of geopolitical imagination in the local context but also the 
resistance on a local level. In this dissertation the practices of European geo-political 
imaginations have been made visible in the contexts of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). The institutional forms of cooperation in the different neighbouring 
countries, for example, are in the local context differently explained in a way that they 
suite the interest and safety concerns of the local actors each on one side. A second 
example can be found on the southern fringes of the EU where harsh border-practices 
have not quite matched the intentions of more openness as described in the various 
EU documents. In order to understand the complexity of practices, their historical 
and socio-economic backgrounds have been extensively analysed by scholars in dif-
ferent fields (many of these examples of concrete analyses have been used in this 
dissertation). However, the understanding of practices is different from thinking of 
practices. Understanding involves a comparative approach where regional variations 
in EU policy making and the categories of actors involved are recognised. The un-
derstanding of practices is useful for a pragmatic level of understanding but fails to 
think beyond the actual phenomena for practices related to EU external relations. The 
case studies that are often involved in the research of practices examine the extent to 
which local communities tend to be included and/or excluded from EU/ENP decision-
making processes, whereas thought reaches beyond the symptoms into the field of 
perspectives. Subsequently, the combination of geo-political research and philosophy 
is of great use in this dissertation. 
Fieldwork During my work as a researcher for the FP5 and FP6 European 
framework programs ‘EXLINEA’ and ‘EUDIMENIONS’ (projects supported by the 
European Commission under the Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme that exam-
ined opportunities and constraints to local/regional cross-border co-operation along 
the EU external border) I carried out extensive fieldwork in Cyprus and the Canary 
Islands. The combined case studies under scrutiny covered the entire external borders 
of the European Union. The case studies I carried out together with my colleagues 
at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR) typify the unique situations of 
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both remote places along the external EU. Cyprus and the Canary Islands represent 
in their distinct ways geopolitical fringes within the larger European context. More 
importantly, however, each of these specific border region contexts is characterised 
by stark social and political asymmetries compared to EU policies and proposals. 
They represent the resistance towards the ideal picture of an enlarged in several stark 
ways: at these borders, problems of accommodating the rights of ethnic minorities 
often coalesce with issues relating to trade, public security, migration, the environ-
ment and identity. These particular constellations of border-sensitive issues are a 
result of complex and difficult histories and geographies (Scott, 2001). Our more local 
oriented fieldwork perspectives revealed a complex and divergent image of subareas, 
groups, cities, borders in their everyday lives. The results of the fieldwork are no strict 
methodological justification for this dissertation. They rather helped me to see the 
gap between generalizing European policy proposals and the rigid local realities on 
Cyprus and the daunting situation with migrants on the Canary Islands. The results 
of the fieldwork have been published in several articles and newspapers that are not 
part of this dissertation but appear in the various chapters to highlight the empirical 
gap between EU geopolitics and the more local level (see Boedeltje and van Houtum, 
2007, Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 2007a, Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2008 and 2009). 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE METHOLOGY
The methodology of the research is based on so-called ‘triangulation’, which supports 
the deconstruction of representations of space and history. This empirical method in-
volves the use of all available means of ‘evidence’ in order to reconstruct a whole from 
all scattered material and which does justice to the reproduction of space. Research 
activities focus on preparatory work, conceptual research, archival work and desk 
research, fieldwork and the synthesis of findings in order to draw conclusions that 
can be related back to the conceptual framework of the thesis. A large share of the 
research time envisaged is devoted to the conceptual level of analysis, where the most 
detailed and extensive theoretical data collection has taken place. This entails uncov-
ering the geopolitical significance in terms of EU discourse and specific policies. As 
such, the constitution of the EU’s policies towards its external borders is thoroughly 
investigated. The formation of the EU policies with impacts on border areas are ana-
lysed as a process conditioned by the following factors:
• As principles defined in the basic EU documents and in the particular docu-
ments and initiatives regarding borders and transnational development (ENP)
• As geopolitical strategies of the EU and nation states (e.g. ENP, EU Common 
Strategies)
• As resulting from continuities and changes in border policies prevailing before 
a certain border became an EU external border. 
• Local and regional cultural/political and economic activities as they have af-
fected border transitions will be researched.
Drawing from various sources, the thesis aims to shed light especially on tensions 
between (sub)national understandings in terms of demarcations based on ethnicity, 
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citizenship, language and socio-cultural characteristics, etc., and broader suprana-
tional/transnational understandings which address Europe and its external borders 
as areas of contact (and, to an extent, transition) between civilisations, and political 
and economic actors and institutions. 
A major research task lies in understanding the complex construction of borders. 
This is done here by adopting an approach that expresses the multilevel complexity 
of European borderlands – from the geopolitical to the level of social practices at and 
across the border (e.g. using Europe’s borderlands as a coping strategy, developing 
crossborder cultural, economic and personal networks, using the border as a ‘place-
making’ strategy). 
This has been done in the following way: 
1. The collection and survey of relevant official documents, political statements, 
press material, newspapers, reports of debates, brochures, local archival work, 
academic publications and books, theories on geopolitics, EU policies and border 
studies EU data (mostly data sources from euro-barometer), archive data (from 
the European Union website), images (taken during fieldwork), policy documents 
(all available COM/SEC documents on EU external relations), political statements 
(from speeches, conferences, seminars), media (film, music, internet), reports and 
debates (EU related), self-reinforcing argumentation and above all books that 
have been used to reconstruct a broad palette of information and visions .  
2. The collection of ethnographic data involving notes from meetings and seminars 
during my work for FP5 ‘Exlinea’ and FP6 ‘EUDIMENSIONS’ across Europe. 
Next to that it involves the collection of notes from interviews with different 
actors during fieldwork for both FP5 and FP6 and the analysis of participative 
observation. This collection will be used to gain insight into perceptions and 
practices and not so much as ‘hard data’ used as empirical evidence.  That is to 
say that there will be no substantial ‘clear’ evidence of such data in any of the 
papers. As an alternative, the arguments in the different papers are constructed 
via a mixture of discourse analysis and original synthesis inspired by the eth-
nographic data. 
Methodology should not be understood from its strict form of comparison or cross-
sectional examining. By that contrary, this proposed research will take the form of 
critical reflections. For that reason, the research will be descriptive to allow approach-
ing bordering processes in specific geographical and social contexts, both in European 
borderlands but also wherever a specific border has impacts, is represented, negotiated 
or displaced. Triangulation means verifying the explanatory values of the various data 
sources as well as evaluating the analytical domain chosen. The empirical sources 
attempt to reconstruct and re-think the geopolitical imaginations (Scott, 2001). The 
overview of the methodology is outlined in figure 2. This overview provides a good 
insight in the process of triangulation and how these various methodological hints 
inspire and enrich the discourse based articles. The reason for including this overview 
as made by Scott (2001) is that most of the empirical work of this thesis has been based 
on this research model as applied in the both FP5 Exlinea and to some extend in FP6 
EUdimensions. The output in terms of the written articles followed for a great part this 
methodological model for reasons of theoretical synthesis within the projects. 
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It has been a clear choice to inspire the articles with the available data as I believe 
this strengthens the overall intention of the articles. The available ethnographic data 
is largely based on snippets, ideas, and subjective observations by the participants 
and not so much constructed of a formal structure of closed/fixed set of interviews 
and other data. My intention with the articles is on the one hand to question the domi-
nant institutional discourses by appealing to their sometimes problematic moral and 
second to contribute to an alternative geopolitical vision that takes into account local 
and historical sensitivities. The methodological approach is, furthermore, a combina-
tion of an extensive study of different border locales and thematic investigations, as 
defined, which intersect with them. While writing, I am well aware that this process 
is never ending and always repeating. However, the aim will be gaining a suffi-
cient amount of perspectives to validate, enrich and extend the geopolitical debate 
on European geopolitics.  
Sources Methods Objectives
Patterns of political, social and 
economic interaction (practices)
The collection of  
written sources 
Gaining insights in the politi-
cal/social/cultural situation in 
European Political decision- 
making and power practices. 
Strategic and political plans, doc-
uments and brochures stemming 
from different governance scales 
(EU and the neighbouring states 
involved in this dissertation)
Reading, text 
analysis, observa-
tion and documen-
tation 
Insights into the policies, inter-
pretations and interests of the 
EU as well as other political ac-
tors in the neighbouring states. 
Scientific and philosophical de-
bates on Europe, the fabrication 
of meaning, production of space 
Text analysis, read-
ing, observation 
and documentation 
Insights into various academic 
debates and traditions
Insights from strategic actors at 
the supranational level (EU/ENP)
Speech analysis of 
ENP documents
Insights into the policies, prac-
tices, narratives, interpretations 
and interests of the relevant 
political actors
(Based on Scott, 2001)
Figure 2: Overview of the methodology
In addition to the aforementioned, I would like to make a point concerning the meth-
ods of research that allows obtaining a coherent and trustful picture of the heteroge-
neous spaces of everyday life. This is in similar terms remarked by Gerard O’Tuathail 
(2010, 8): ‘How is ground-level expertise to be acquired and what are the ethics of 
the research methods employed?’ He points to the difficulties and time management 
of extensive fieldwork (in his case ethnographic research) and the fact that these 
methods ‘require significant intellectual labour investment’. O’Tuathail has a valuable 
point when he states that ‘while extended fieldwork and local language competence 
are undoubtedly desirable, full time academic employment does not necessarily allow 
this’. Other methods like survey research, elite interviewing and focus groups, are 
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according to O’Tuathail of similar importance and can enable ‘comparative research 
and analysis.’ Next to fieldwork and ethnographic research, other means of gathering 
information might also be considered. In case of Belarus in in this dissertation, the 
genre of travel writing provides a valuable insight in the everyday reproduction of 
nationhood and alternative personalized narratives. Moreover, I argue that alterna-
tive ways of voicing a geopolitical situation might be powerful alternatives as the case 
of Cyprus has exemplified. 
Next to that, an alternative way of practicing the study of geopolitics might involve 
considering platforms of publication other than academic journals and conferences 
(this is also proposed by Antonsich, 2009). Newspapers, magazines (for example the 
well written and influential articles by Tom Junod for Esquire, and in particular his 
2003 article ‘The falling man’ which is widely considered to be one of the best arti-
cles on 9/11), multimedia but also music and documentaries (for example the Dutch 
‘Tegenlicht’) directly engage with the lives of people at a different but nonetheless pow-
erful level. The impact of these platforms should not be underestimated and the transla-
tion of academic material into broader and more popular material might be one of the 
challenges (Together with my colleagues I tend to translate most academic publications 
into newspaper articles and magazine publications. The result has been positive and 
the public reactions overwhelming (See for example the publication by van Houtum, 
Boedeltje and Fumero-Padron in the Spanish newspaper El Pais on the situation on the 
external borders between Spain and Morocco in the references). However, while explor-
ing new grounds of research, I would like to recall O’Tuathail’s (2010, 8) remark that ‘the 
issue of research ethics is extremely important and can only be underscored here. The 
admonition “do no harm” is a useful starting point but certain conflicts and situations 
require clear moral situatedness and normative principles transparently expressed’. In 
a time of changing societies, globalization and contested geopolitics, I would like to add 
that an important task for critical geopoliticians is defending the ongoing movement of 
research in exploring new conceptual boundaries.  
1.6 INNOVATION/ORIGINALITY
This thesis aims on the one hand to inform and enrich the scientific debate over the 
political significance of the transition of Europe and its borders within the context of 
European integration. In doing so the project contributes to a new conceptualisation 
of Europe as spaces created by social interactions, institutions and rules operating 
at different spatial levels. On the other hand, it seeks to enrich policy debate by criti-
cally discussing the experiences and lessons learned since 1990 in areas located on 
the EU’s external borders. Building on the wealth of available research, the thesis 
provides a sophisticated theoretical framework and research design with which to 
better understand the significance of changing European spaces as a process of socio-
political transformation.
As the EU’s boundaries shift geographically, it is necessary to investigate the extent 
to which meaningful forms of collective action are emerging on the external borders 
of the EU. The transition of European borders presents a major political, economic and 
social challenge for the European Union. It will also have far-reaching effects on the 
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neighbouring countries (and their regions) who must deal with fundamental societal 
transformations and rapid structural change. In border regions diverse socio-economic 
conditions and practices increasingly confront each other, opening prospects for trade 
and co-operation but, at the same time, often encouraging undesirable and problematic 
activities and even resulting in misunderstanding and conflict.
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY    
With this introduction I have tried to capture the momentum of European geopolitics 
to serve as a starting point for this dissertation while providing a consistent basis in 
coming to terms with the transition of European geopolitics. 
Next to this general introduction, I further clarify the transitions in European 
geopolitics in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. I start with indicating 
the role of European geopolitics within the broader geopolitical conceptual frame-
work, which in its own way has established a rich literature marking the evolution 
of geopolitics in the past decades. Chapter three introduces Europe as research case. 
Here I argue that the conceptualization of geopolitics in Europe is characterized by 
a rather new geopolitics of shifting territorialities, blurring identities and new forms 
of geographies emerging from the changing role of society. Rather than analysing 
and advising, geographers tend to focus on the implications of the shifting patterns 
of (European) geopolitics, by emphasizing new forms of inclusion and exclusion, 
inequalities, social justice and marginalized groups and people. 
Subsequently, I argue that critical geopolitics is a useful sub-discipline to reflect on 
the geopolitical and territorial confusion between Europe and the EU. From the critical 
viewpoint I develop two distinct conceptualizations of Europe. I argue that the first 
image foresees a homogeneous Europe that is eventually capable of replacing the state, 
an ideal place in which the citizens of Europe can enjoy their diversity by unity. From 
the perspective of the EU, this desire of a good, secure and prosperous Europe reflects 
very much a geography of desire or what I would will call EU-topia (the ideal place). 
The fourth chapter makes a careful analysis of the construction of the EU-topia. How 
it foresees a distinct future for Europe and how it foresees its ideal geopolitics. 
This image is in itself not harmful or undesirable, however, by means of the in-
troduction of a geography of resistance (heterotopias) I argue that the hegemonic 
discourse of the European Union increasingly makes a distinct difference between 
Europeans and non-Europeans, between neighbours and citizens, between European 
and non-European neighbourhoods and that this contradicts with the complex re-
alities and everyday lives of people along and across the EU borders. As these ideal 
images make their way along the policy- making decision line, the gap between the 
ideal image and the complex realities becomes visible. The heterogeneous geogra-
phies of resistance that will be called heterotopias are the disturbing places, images 
and voices that undermine utopias and counter the dominant EU discourse. In a 
sense they relate to Lefebvre’s ‘differential spaces’. Chapter five searches for distinct 
heterotopias across Europe. 
Tensions arising from the gap between EU-topia and empirical reality are out-
lined in two examples. The first example is Belarus and reflects the tension between 
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on the one hand EU-topia as ideal and on the other the invisibility of Belarus on the 
European map. This tension between imagination and invisibility embodies the ques-
tion where the ideal version of Europe begins, and where it ends. The second example 
is Cyprus. During my work as a researcher for the FP5 project ‘Exlinea’ I carried out 
extensive research on the EU enlargement process of the island in 2004. The outcomes 
of the research reflect the tension between two divergent versions of Europeanness. 
How bearable is it for a community to have a different view and to be part of a com-
munity that is separated between the ideal image given in by the European Union 
and the complex local historical context. In the last part of this chapter I outline how 
heterotopias can lead to alternative geopolitical vision within European geopolitics. 
This is followed by a conclusion in which I will be in search for the answers as ques-
tioned in research objective. Subsequently, the implications for future research will 
outline how a different way of looking at European geopolitics contributes to an 
alternative geopolitical way of seeing Europe.
The choice why to include the distinct empirical cases of Cyprus and Belarus has 
risen from the ‘otherness’ of both cases. The choice to incorporate Cyprus and Belarus 
as empirical cases comes from the fact that both countries undermine the ‘normality’ 
of an institutionalized version of Europe. Both examples share that they do not follow 
the logic of the institutional policy logic of Brussels. They help us to see a different 
version of Europe, which is different from the increasingly dominant institutional-
ized vision. Both cases share that they reveal a different social spatialization (which 
is not the bounded homogeneous Europe) and also a different spatial socialization 
(the construction of European otherness, by using for example identity narratives and 
also politicized symbols mediated through citizens and pressure groups). Especially 
the institutional European discourse on Cyprus lacks the historical and local sensi-
tivities in its policy approaches. The same is in a sense true for Belarus, where the 
difficult lingual mixture that divides the country is not taken into account and that 
the institutional focus is solely bounded to the absence of European values such as 
democracy and economic liberalism.  
Both examples add a critical and different geographical understanding to the in-
creasingly dominant institutional discourses on Europe. From my own experience it 
is also important to notice that the institutional discourse is increasingly becoming 
the dominant perception within academic discourse. For example, many curricula in 
spatial planning, environmental studies, international relations and geography take 
institutional discourses of the EU as objects of analysis in their programs. While it 
is certainly a favourable development of taking European Union discourse as object 
of analysis, a critical stance towards this development is needed. A critical question-
ing of the dominant institutional discourse through the use of heterotopias helps to 
see the totality of representations contained in the space. According Ed Soja (1995) 
heterotopias increase and broaden the theoretical understanding of geographers by 
helping them to generate new ideas and new visions to rediscover the spaces and 
places that contest, reshape and refresh the existing discourses.
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2 European Geopolitics in a 
Wider Perspective:  
a Conceptual Framework
2.1 CONTEXTUALIZING GEOPOLITCS 
The wider perspective of the geopolitical framework of Europe is analysed in this 
chapter. In the broader angle of geopolitics the following axiom seems to matter: 
Deconstructing the meaning of Europe means deconstructing the meaning of bor-
ders (relating to the question where wider Europe ends and where it begins). In the 
transition of European external borders, the notion of territory and geopolitics is of 
significant importance. This idea of borders as socially constructed and non-static is 
relatively new in the practice of geopolitics. For many decades border studies, territo-
riality and border conflicts were studied from the definition that borders and bounda-
ries were fixed lines separating sovereign territories, dividing the world into bounded 
political units, commonly referred to as states. As political scientist Kari Laitinen 
(2003, 26) points out ‘the charm and success of traditional geopolitics has been based 
on its ability to make a comprehensive political map of the world. Along with the map 
it is possible to locate and organise the relationships and dynamics between local and 
regional/national and global, and to form an understandable politico-security entity’. 
From this point of view, borders were associated with territoriality and the meaning 
or identification with this territoriality. In similar terms David Storey (2001, 17) has 
remarked that 'territory provides an essential link between society and the space it 
occupies primarily through its impact on human interaction and the development of 
groups spatial identities'. 
Bordering political space in Hobbesian terms replaced pre-modern medieval 
structures with the emerging of the modern Nation-State in the 18th century. Borders 
functioned here to bound and secure the socio-political settlement and economic 
administration into sovereign entities creating a collective ethos of interdependen-
cies in what Pierre Bourdieu once called Habitus (1987). In this sense, the meaning of 
borders is historically contingent, and part of a continuous reproduction of territories 
and notions of territoriality even if they are always more or less arbitrary lines be-
tween territorial entities, they have deep symbolic, cultural, historical and religious, 
often contested, meanings for social communities and manifest themselves in various 
social, political and cultural practices (see Newman, Paasi, 1998, 187/188). 
The Hobbesian bordering of territory is related to the traditional study of geopoli-
tics. Geopolitics according to Laitinen (2003, 25) is ‘a political doctrine where geogra-
phy is used to argue for political ends and purposes’. He defines three different mod-
els through which traditional geopolitics operates: Geopolitics as ‘analytical model 
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studies the causal relations between environment and politics’. As scientific model 
‘geopolitics explores the meaning of physical environment of human being in the 
context of certain social action’ and thirdly as political agenda ‘geopolitics means a 
political projection directed against the environment’. In this conventional meaning, 
geopolitics has a strong connection to ‘scientific positivism’ and also ‘the discipline of 
political realism of international relations as a component of deterministic environ-
mental conception’. The bordering of political space according to traditional geopo-
litical thinking has been related to the security of a defined territory against possible 
threats by the stranger and the unknown ‘Other’ behind the border something the 
traditional Hobbesian state still stands for and as Laitinen (2003, 25) remarks ‘sym-
bolises the legitimate monopoly of violence and spatial order of a certain area and 
denotes the discursive field of a state, which includes people, symbols, institutions 
and the machinery of coercion’. In this respect diverging languages of belonging and 
not belonging on both sides have fostered and strengthened ideas about difference. If 
the state is able to define itself as political entity or as supranational institution then 
it is at the same time defining itself through the territorialisation of space
An important point is that the characteristics of contemporary Europe is indeed 
significantly different from the traditional geopolitical bordering of space. Borders, 
identity and the dynamics of power are far from being static and the on-going process 
of globalisation and communication has had significant influence on these geopoliti-
cal concepts. The current geopolitical map is far from clear in the current era of con-
fusing geographies and globalisation since it, in the words of O’Tuathail and Dalby 
(1998, 16), ‘disturbs its time-worn conditions of possibility, its conventional geographi-
cal rhetoric, its traditional territorial objects, and its ontological purities’. Next to that 
Laitinen (2003, 26) remarks that today’s geopolitical landscape is more complicated 
and therefore needs more sophisticated analytical tools by pointing to the fact that 
geopolitics today is heavily influenced by globalisation and geo-economics, eco-pol-
itics and religious issues play an important role in international political discourse
The basis for this more critical geopolitical approach on the changing circumstances 
of contemporary geopolitics has, to some extent, its roots in the rise of critical geogra-
phy in the 1970s. I have to remark that the connection between critical and geography 
is in itself not special or new. The general and considered task of geographer has always 
been to look critically at spatial processes. However, the contemporary meaning of 
critical geography relates to the more modern variant of ‘radical geography’. Radical ge-
ography dates back to the 1970s and was inspired by two major events: Environmental 
and societal concerns contested the fixed views of positivist Hobbesian geopolitics and 
radical geographers mainly in the United States responded by creating a movement 
that was 'anarchic and exuberant, naive yet nuanced' (Blomley, 2006, 89). The second im-
portant event took place in the second half of the 1970s and implied a more widespread 
critique on quantitative domination in geographical research. This was especially in-
spired by Marxists theories and most notably introduced by people like David Harvey. 
Blomley (ibid) remarks that these events resulted in a fragmentation of geopolitics in 
directions as wide as humanistic, feminist and Marxist that moved away from ‘struc-
tural’ or deterministic geographical theories that were dominant. These changes in 
the discipline of geography to some extent explain the rise of a more critical political 
geography at the end of the 1980s. 
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However, perhaps even more crucial in the emergence of critical geopolitics is the 
impact of post structural ‘constructivism’ in International Relations Studies. Critical 
IR scholars like Ashly (1987), Luke (1989), Campbell (1992), Shapiro (1981, 1984, 1988) 
developed new approaches in which diverging textual materials became objects of 
critical research, in particular in the analysis of foreign policy discourses and how a 
narrow state centric vision is constructed in these discourses. Much of this criticism is 
in fact criticism of interventionist, top-down approaches. What is criticized are some 
of the assumptions that play a role in global geopolitics, including the predominance 
of the free market and discourse of the ‘Other’. The reasons for this criticism not so 
much include the lack of imagination to think of alternatives for western solutions; 
but more the ease and dominance of the Western discourse. The critique by these 
authors on specific western political discourse refers to its implicit moral superiority 
–taking the Western democratic state as a norm for countries throughout the world– 
coupled with undue optimism about the extent to which faraway, troubled countries 
can be reformed. According to Shapiro ‘the violent process of state consolidation 
was in part driven by legitimation-oriented projects. The intent was to create states 
that contain unitary and coherent national cultures. Neglecting the institutionalized 
violence exposed in counter-narratives pointing to the violence of state consolidation, 
much of American social and political science has been “professional” in the sense 
that what has been professed is a trained inattention to the historical meta-politics of 
their political imaginaries’ (Shapiro, 2004, 6).  
Other radical critics have argued that the hegemonic discourse is in the first place 
not in the interest of ‘weak’ non-western states but primarily aims at enhancing politi-
cal and economic interests of the west, significantly overlooking as Dalby, (2008, 426) 
remarks the geographies that geopolitical discourse carefully ignores in its imagina-
tions of its enemies and its rationales for military intervention. 
The rise of post structuralist criticism in IR studies can be read in the context 
of a significant increase in the global willingness to intervene in domestic conflict 
since the Reagan era and the violent conflicts in Latin America. The more critical 
oriented direction was strengthened by the zeitgeist surrounding the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall and the general mood that inspired a more post-structural approach 
that contested the state as central focus of research. This was further motivated by 
post-Cold War optimism about international intervention, exemplified by the idea 
of what became known as an emerging US led ‘new world order’. These geopolitical 
interventions (Megoran coins George H. W. Bush’s ‘New World Order’ wars in Iraq 
(1991) and Somalia (1992), Bill Clinton’s Bosnian (1995) and Kosovo (1999) wars, and 
George W. Bush’s ‘War on terror’ invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)) 
were motivated by more ambitious goals like regime change and societal transfor-
mation, the strengthening of the rule of law, good governance and democratization. 
No longer was peacekeeping the sole aim, but under influence of a global sense of 
neo-liberalism ‘peace building’ was introduced as the new international strategy to 
deal with global conflicts, which included a wide array of civil tasks, from the or-
ganization of elections to the writing of laws.1 The post-cold war idea of a global geo-
political framework inspired by a neo-liberal peace emerged as Dalby (2008, 414) out 
1  Such thinking was exemplified in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’, and its 1995 supplement.
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of the ‘new geopolitics” of the 1980s and the American foreign policy of the Reagan 
administration with its explicit attempts to shore up a declining hegemony through 
the use of military force .´  
In this perspective it is also of interest to refer to O’Tuathail and Agnew’s (1992, 
194) article on Geopolitical reasoning which was published in the early nineties. 
(Practical) geopolitical reasoning is explained as ‘reasoning by means of consensual 
and unremarkable assumptions about places and their particular identities. This is 
the reasoning of practitioners of statecraft, of statespersons, politicians and military 
Commanders’. According to O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 194) ‘geopolitical reasoning 
begins at a very simple level and is a pervasive part of the practice of international 
politics. It is an innately political process of representation by which the intellectuals 
of statecraft designate a world and ‘fill’ it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and 
dilemmas. All statespersons engage in the practice; it is one of the norms of the world 
political community. For example simply describing a different or indeed the same 
place as ‘Western’ is silently to designate an implicit foreign policy’. 
The consensus of such norms of western, non-western, failed states or evil ‘oth-
ers’ is normally based on the hegemonic vision represented by a discourse implied 
by the dominant world power. In case of the post-cold war period the hegemonic 
discourse was increasingly embodied by the United States after the disintegration 
of the Soviet-Union. As O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992, 195) argue, the hegemonic sta-
tus of the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War represents by 
definition the ‘rule-writer’ for the world community. They continue to remark that 
‘those in power within the institutions of the hegemonic state become the deans of 
world politics, the administrators, regulators and geographers of international affairs, 
Their power is a power to constitute the terms of geopolitical world order, an order-
ing of international space which defines the central drama of international politics in 
particularistic ways’. One of the consequences of hegemonic geopolitical reasoning 
is that a coherent common or international doctrine or agreed-upon set of necessary 
institutional arrangements never emerged (Goodhand 2006, 179). 
The instable and often contradictory status of shifting geopolitical visions has 
resulted in a rather fragmented scope of arguments. This can partly be explained by 
the domestic, personal and international geo-economic interest of the ‘rule writer’. 
O’Tuathail has recognized this point by observing that administrations often bypass 
internal expertise or ignore the people in office: ‘They make blatantly domestic politi-
cal calculations about foreign policy and its discourse’ (O’Tuathail, 2010, 8). Next to 
that hegemonic discourse and alterations are often further simplified and coloured 
by public opinion and, in particular, the mass media. O’Tuathail (1996, 173) has in 
a different writing remarked that ‘this discourse and the structured way of seeing 
that accompanies it inevitably reproduces the state-centric and essentialist identity 
reasoning (i.e. there is no language for hybridity) of the various parties involved. 
Rather, the most significant clash is one of discourses and not of institutions or es-
sential subject positions’.   
What this reveals is that liberal discourses embody certain trends. Though geo-
political interventions are usually presented as instrumental and value-free, they 
often represent a coherent, western, liberal political agenda (Richmond, 2006). There 
is a striking convergence in all contemporary geopolitical intervention practices, in 
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emphasizing a particular package of interventions: coupling democratic governance 
reform, the promotion of human rights, the encouragement of civil society and a 
free market economy, and the advancement of the rule of law, good governance and 
a viable and functioning state. One particular example in this context is made by 
Dalby (2008, 422) who remarks that ‘the view from Washington during the Clinton 
administration shifted focus a number of times with attention paid to the dangers of 
collapsing states, genocides and environmental threats. New emphasis on such mat-
ters contributed to a focus on key pivotal states in the South, those whose political 
stability was judged to be essential to regional stability, and hence a matter of priority 
for security planners given the threats these regions might potentially pose to global 
order’. What these examples indicate is that these discourses, policies and practices 
in post-conflict countries aim to transform societies in the image of Western, market-
oriented democracies (Chandler, 2006, Duffield, 2001, van Leeuwen, 2009) in which 
universal values are promoted as a remedy for local problems (van Leeuwen, 2009).
Dalby (2008, 421) sharply observers that this perspective indicates that global geo-
politics is very much security oriented and  ‘Explained in terms of external threats 
issued from someplace beyond the sphere of political action to which military or 
political management strategies should be applied to impose solutions’. From this 
perspective the security discourse seems silently living on in ‘New word Order’ fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union. New threats were imagined and invented in 
order to maintain the face of the external enemy.
More specifically, critics within the broader discipline of geopolitical analysis 
question the feasibility and moral desirability of interventionist, ‘top-down’, social 
engineering in far-away societies. This leads them to call, for example, for more local 
perspective (as pointed out by the later work of O’Tuathail, starting from his later 
work on Bosnia).
Inspired by post structural ideas and the radical dissidents of IR studies, critical 
geopolitics gradually shifted to cultural, representational and identity questions on 
not only local but also supra-national levels of geographical analysis. In particular 
feminist geography played an important role in the ongoing transition of tradition-
al geopolitical visions to a thorough analysis of the production of power. Jennifer 
Hyndman (2010, 317) recently emphasized the important role of feminist geography 
within changing geopolitics. She argues that a critical way of looking at geopolitics 
‘decentres the nation state, but in its quest to destabilize the normative, it rarely engag-
es in transformative or embodied ways of knowing and seeing. Feminist geopolitics 
has offered up a fix to this conundrum’. What she refers to is a distinct way of seeing 
and what Jennifer Fluri (2009 260) has termed ‘examining the personal, private and 
everyday scales of resistance to existing power hierarchies and the role and power of 
reproduction as significant geopolitical projects’. 
As a result of these developments and the progress towards approaches that look 
at alternative geopolitical narratives, sophisticated literature now largely corrobo-
rates the relevance of more critical approaches to changing European geopolitics at 
many scales (O’Dowd, 2010, Scott and van Houtum, 2009, Anderson and O’Dowd, 
1999, Newman and Paasi, 1998, van Houtum et al, 2002 are just a few examples). As a 
consequence, it is hard to even think anymore about European borderlands as mere 
landscapes of rivers, mountains and trees, the physical landscapes of traditional geo-
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political interest in idiographic aerial differentiation. It is not just the physical 'place' 
that is necessary for the existence of identity and social consciousness but more im-
portant, historical facts, myths and images are important elements in the construction 
of identity and social consciousness (Boedeltje et al., 2006). 
Of these varied perspectives, the critical geopolitical viewpoint in particular has 
offered us a powerful conceptual framework for apprehending the complex set of 
forces producing and reproducing institutionalised relations of difference across the 
current political borders in Europe (see for example Paasi, 2001 and Kramsch and 
Hooper, 2004). This means that a border, whether international or national, is not 
only a real representation of something visible but also the idea of an invisible border 
wandering through our head and that is constantly re-shaped by political discourse, 
collective cultural discourse and social authority. Subsequently, borders are, accord-
ing to Newman and Paasi (1998, 196), ‘one part of the discursive landscape of social 
power, control and governance, which extend itself into the whole society and which 
is produced and reproduced in various social and cultural practices. The boundary 
does not limit itself merely to the border area or landscape itself, but more generally 
manifest itself in social and cultural practices and legislation'. In this complexity 
critical-geopolitics is able to interpret the wires of today’s European geopolitics in a 
way that has been nicely described by Gerard O’Tuathail (2010, 2) as something that 
‘disaggregates rather than homogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather 
than globalizes analysis and explanation’ (O’Tuathail, 2010, 2). Here geopolitics func-
tions as tool to gaze beyond traditional geopolitical narratives as used by EU geopoli-
tics towards more alternative political narratives.
However the euphoria surrounding the renewed theoretical directions should not 
be over-exaggerated, critical geopolitics itself has recently been contested in geographi-
cal scholarly debate not only by on-going realpolitical realities across the globe, but also 
by the relatively marginal impact of these critical voices within public opinion and poli-
tics (media, think tanks, NGO’s etc). Laitinen (2003, 26) sharply observes that European 
geopolitics still remains characterized be ‘certain elements of traditional geopolitical 
thinking’ that includes a particular focus on borders as lines of demarcation and ter-
ritorial makers. Furthermore, in various recent calls in Political Geography (Megoran, 
2010 and Antonsich, 2009) the question of ‘influence’ and ‘impact’ of critical geopolitics 
was discussed in relation to an article written by the influential journalist Robert D. 
Kaplan that appeared in the dominant American journal Foreign Policy. Kaplan’s (2009) 
argument in ‘The revenge of Geography’ is - in the traditional geopolitical tradition - 
deterministic and written from a universal liberal perspective in which he describes 
the potential threat of Eurasian ‘shatter zones’. Marco Antonsich, one of the authors 
who responded to Kaplan’s article, recalls the long list of critiques on such geopolitical 
determinations (among them Simon Dalby) but sharply observers that most contempo-
rary critical geographers shy away from tackling big geopolitical questions like Kaplan. 
Moreover, Nick Megoran (in press) also replied that Kaplan’s article ‘is a painful re-
minder to political geographers of the need to take neoclassical geopolitics seriously’, 
not in the last place because Kaplan is politically influential as national correspondent 
for the Atlantic and senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security. 
Kaplan’s realist argument is, as he mentions himself, all about geography and not 
so much about ideas, an argument far from new or groundbreaking. However, he sees 
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geography in a rather different way by provoking critical geopolitics. Kaplan starts his 
article with a remark on the Global War on Terror and especially on the War in Iraq, 
which he supported for various reasons. What he, according to himself, learned from 
the war was the return of realism after the failure of what happened in Iraq. Those 
who opposed the war were right according to Kaplan, but on different grounds than 
he suggests in his article. Critical geographers who opposed the war in Iraq did that on 
grounds given by morality and social justice, on grounds of people and ideas. However, 
realism according to Kaplan (2009, 97) means quite the opposite namely ‘recogniz-
ing that international relations are ruled by a sadder, more limited reality than the 
one governing domestic affairs. It means valuing order above freedom, for the latter 
becomes important only after the former has been established’. Instead of thinking in 
possibilities, equality, social justice and inclusion as critical geopolitics does, Kaplan 
(ibid) proposes that the focus should aim ‘on what divides humanity rather than on 
what unites it, as the high priests of globalization would have it’. In other words realism 
for Kaplan is ‘about recognizing and embracing those forces beyond our control that 
constrain human action—culture, tradition, history, the bleaker tides of passion that lie 
just beneath the veneer of civilization’. And indeed instead of asking the critical ‘why’ 
question, Kaplan (ibid) turns immediately to the political questions by posing what he 
calls the central question in foreign affairs: ‘Who can do what to whom?’ What divides 
us most and turns out to be the greatest ‘unsavoury truth in which realism is rooted, 
the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic of all: Geography.’ 
This is a surprisingly different view from the critical viewpoint. Kaplan presents 
geography as revenge and as something definite that divides the world into a clear 
map of natural spaces. He brings geography back to what he calls its honoured posi-
tion as formalized and distinct discipline in which ‘politics, culture, and economics 
were often conceived of in reference to the relief map.’ On this relief there were first 
and foremost the mountains and rivers before anything else. Then there were men 
who grow out of them that formed the first sequence of reality; ideas, however uplift-
ing, came only second (Kaplan, 2009, 97). 
Geography as deterministic factor in which men appear in particular places on the 
map serves according to Kaplan (ibid) ‘to qualify human freedom and choice with a 
modest acceptance of fate’. In this context, fate has determined that particular people 
are born in particular places. In which their freedom seems limited by geography. 
Kaplan seems to suggest that it is almost impossible to escape fate and that migra-
tion or globalisation seems to have not succeeded in providing more freedom. He 
rather suggests that globalisation is reinforcing the importance of geography instead 
of changing it. He points out that ‘mass communications and economic integration 
are weakening many states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. 
Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting them-
selves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains, they are best explained 
by reference to geography’ (Kaplan, 2009, 97). Kaplan doesn’t link particular people 
in particular places (the notorious blut und boden as proposed by those who believe 
that a certain geographical zone belongs to a certain people with distinct values 
and characteristics), but rather situates fortunate and less fortunate people on the 
map, which for him is the principle of fate. The political future of the unlucky part 
of the world that is born in remote war zones or the dry deserts of Africa defined by 
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conflict and instability operates according to Kaplan under the deterministic logic of 
geography. Globalisation and the effects of the global financial crisis as well as fast 
population growth reveals the increasing relevance of geography even further in 
which the natural frontiers of the globe act as the only restraining borders in a world 
that is characterized by weakening and disintegrating social orders and other crea-
tions of humankind (Kaplan, 2009, 97). Therefore Kaplan’s new map is of surprising 
simplicity in an otherwise complex world. In this new reality socially constructed (or 
artificial) borders will be contested and porous, leaving only the ‘enduring facts of 
geography’ (Kaplan, 2009, 102). His future scenario sketches the physical features of 
the landscape as the sole reliable guides left in the understanding of future conflict. 
As Kaplan is senior fellow at the Centre for a New American Security, his new 
map of the shatter zones of Eurasia is at the same time also a new map of security 
risks. Simon Dalby (2008, 421) has on a different occasion observed that security 
remains ‘explained in terms of external threats issued from someplace beyond the 
sphere of political action to which military or political management strategies should 
be applied to impose solutions’. The geopolitical discourse is given in by the fact that 
the danger of a renewed enemy has to be found in the external world (for example in 
the shatter zones). According to Dalby, this way of seeing security is seen by nearly all 
‘security intellectuals’ in Washington. In this security discourse Kaplan remarks that 
there is no peaceful map of the world. It is geography that divides the world forever 
in claustrophobic shatter zones that are an imminent security threat. As Kaplan (2009, 
105) remarks ‘this was always the case, and it is harder to deny now, as the ongoing 
recession will likely cause the global economy to contract for the first time in six 
decades. Not only wealth, but political and social order, will erode in many places, 
leaving only nature's frontiers and men's passions as the main arbiters of that age-old 
question: Who can coerce whom?’ From the perspective of Kaplan and other deter-
ministic geographers the security discourse of a threatening world full of remote and 
dangerous zones seems to be as strong as ever.
When returning to the recent call of critical political geographers of not shying 
away from engaging directly in bigger political questions, the observation learns that 
Kaplan has significantly more influence on the political decision making progress 
than most critical geographers. Kaplan is determined to spread liberal capitalism, but 
after the failure in Iraq and Afghanistan he comes to the conclusion that geography 
remains the main enemy of liberal capitalism to flow. His direct political engagement 
becomes clear in the final part of the article in which he advises the political centre in 
Washington that it is wise ‘to look hard at the map for ingenious ways to stretch the 
limits it imposes, which will make any support for liberal principles in the world far 
more effective. Amid the revenge of geography, that is the essence of realism and the 
crux of wise policy making—working near the edge of what is possible, without slip-
ping into the precipice’ (Kaplan, 2009, 105). This is Kaplan’s contribution of the limits 
of military intervention: Don’t change what geography has decided to be instable 
and chaotic. Nonetheless, this surprisingly simple conclusion that is able to indicate 
complex lives, realties, contradictions and processes with just a dot on the map has 
found great support among policy makers in Washington. 
In this simplified but nonetheless realistic world of policy makers and political 
advisors Kaplan (2009, 105) concludes by stating that ‘geographical determinists must 
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be seated at the same honoured table as liberal humanists’. When we take into account 
that all hegemonic policy models including that of the European Union and its exter-
nal policies towards the neighbouring countries, downscale the world into a simpli-
fied map, it might well explain the current frustration to translate critical geography 
into an alternative and transformative geopolitics that directly engage on the level of 
the political world. However, Kaplan suits the political discourse of policymakers for 
the reason that he ‘speaks’ a similar language. This particular geopolitical discourse 
is a completely different world in which ‘practical use’ is the key indicator. Critical 
voices seem, by their persistent questioning, not directly of ‘practical’ use, since they 
interrogate the logic of causal relations. This seems to be another explanation of why 
deterministic geographers like Kaplan engage easier with political visions especially 
since they are security oriented. However, Kaplan’s article might well function as a 
call for critical geographers to push the boundaries and taboos by seeking new ways 
in bringing ideas and alternatives to the table while simultaneously continuing with 
unravelling the hidden geopolitical intentions of policy makers who are engaged in 
traditional geopolitics.
When taking this critique seriously it is important to note the words of Laitinen 
(2003, 27) when he remarks that critical geopolitics ‘does not take for granted politics 
or scientific ‘truths’, but one does want to question the, often implicit, underlying as-
sumptions which affect the way we understand the world and reality and accordingly 
relieve borders, space and security of the burdens of the Cold war in order to have 
a possibility for change’. Therefore, one of the gains of critical geopolitics is that it 
opened up a space for geographical diversity. The result might indeed be, as noted by 
Blomley, that contemporary geopolitics lost its ability to speak with one (traditional) 
voice, or with a distinct theoretical identity. As this theoretical overview has indicated 
contemporary geopolitics loosely shifts between contradictory critical concepts, real-
ist and positivist concepts, border studies, post-modern critical geopolitics, govern-
mentality and feminist insights that are simultaneously used. However, despite its 
diversity and contradictory status as discipline geopolitics and its sub-discipline criti-
cal geopolitics can nonetheless act as what Gerard O’Tuathail (1996, 173) famously de-
scribed as ‘a disturbing way of seeing that disrupts the framework of the hegemonic 
geopolitical eye that structures the seeing in contemporary foreign policy discourse’. 
I agree with Blomley (2006, 92) that critical geographers should seek for ‘change not 
only through transformative insight but also through forms of progressive praxis’ for 
the reason that they not only question the normative and dominant discourses, but 
also engage in transformative and alternative ways of seeing. 
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3 EUROPE – as Research Case
3.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENP 
When descending to the level of geopolitics in Europe it is worth noticing that the 
complexities of policies concerning 'wider Europe' impose challenges related to tra-
ditional forms of geopolitics but at the same time demands a critical perspective. 
In order to grasp these challenges it is important to make a thorough diagnosis of 
the broader evolutional geopolitical context in which the ENP progressed. The re-
mark has to be made that the first ideas of an external EU policy were advanced by 
the northern member states for some of the northern neighbours (as a follow up of 
the stronger historical and the northern dimension), but were soon sustained by the 
southern member states for their Mediterranean neighbours. Moreover, after 9/11 the 
awareness of possible security threats invoked a geopolitical re-thinking drawing 
from processes in the Arab neighbourhood (Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 30). 
Following this, the European Neighbourhood Policy was primarily presented 
by the European Commission in 2003 in its communication titled ‘Wider Europe-
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’ (COM 2003 104 final) a progressive integration proposal for the coun-
tries bordering the European Union. After permission of the council, the commu-
nication was further worked out in a follow up called ‘Paving the way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument’ (COM 2003 393 final). These communications provided 
the basis for further discussions, communication and a series of Green and White 
papers resulting in progress reports in the autumn of 2003 and early 2004. In May 
2004, the communication wrote a Strategy paper (COM (2004 373 final) and held ex-
ploratory talks with neighbouring states which were followed by country reports of 
the candidate states (SEC, 2004). 
In November 2004 the commission wrote two proposals for the imple-
mentation of the Action Plans (COM (2004) 795 final) and the establishing of a 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (COM 2004 628 final). The 
first Action Plans were presented in December 2004 under responsibility of the 
Barroso Commission. Action plans are political documents based on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy framework and contain concrete tailor-made individual pri-
orities, targets and policies agreed with partner states for the duration of at least three 
years with the option of renewal on mutual agreement and will draw on the legal 
basis set by the different existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and 
Association Agreements, such as the 1995 Barcelona Process (Speech/04/141). Action 
Plans can be regarded as the equivalent of the Copenhagen criteria for the candidate 
states mainly linked to domestic policy programs, with an endless list of criteria to 
be fulfilled. They outline in approximately 25 pages of commitments from both sides 
in various areas and issues (Speech/04/141) such as: 
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• ‘Enhanced political co-operation in addressing common security threats and 
conflict prevention;’
• ‘Economic reform and development, and a functioning market economy;’
• ‘Issues relating to the internal market, including trade liberalisation, co-opera-
tion in areas such as energy, and transport;’
• ‘Co-operation in the field of Justice and Home affairs;’
• ‘Development of infrastructure networks and markets for energy, transport and 
telecommunications, and co-operation on the environment;’
• Policies to promote people-to-people contact, for instance in education, research 
and development, culture, and through the gradual opening-up of certain com-
munity programmes’. 
A peculiar absent in the sum up of the Action Plans content is the prospect for libera-
tion on the movement of persons (visas or migration), one of the four freedoms (free-
dom of movement, goods, services, capital and persons) (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 
9). Moreover, a strong accent is placed on bilateral relations which Johansson-Nogues 
(2004, 224) describes as ‘a step backwards’ and continuing the pre-partnership condi-
tion of hub-and-spoke relations’. 
Enhanced political co-operation, however, has so far not been a strong point of 
the EU and has never been profoundly activated through any clause in the various 
policies and agenda’s. Therefore, the scope to concretely intervene in political trans-
formation processes is heavily constrained by the fact that the Action Plans have been 
agreed on non-exploitational terms by both sides and are not defined in operational 
or legally binding terms (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 9). In this context the EU poli-
cies to support political and even societal transformation and reform will to a great 
extend rely on bilateral action of member states, the so called ‘track 2’ actions which 
are executed by NGOs, think-tanks and scientists supported by the EU, and finally 
technical assistance in the field of democracy, rule of law and civil society nexus 
where it is desired, provided by the EU (Jones and Emerson, 2005, 21).    
Regional and transnational co-operation programmes addressed in the various 
Action Plans are facilitated through EU financing instruments, regulated through the 
European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI) and consist of nearly 
12 billion Euro for the ENP region for the period 2007-2013. The ENPI incorporates 
all former geographical instruments promoting sub-regional and transnational co-
operation are all governed by different regulations. 
The INTEREGG instrument based on the European Union’s structural funds is in-
tended for cooperation between European Union regions and can currently not be 
used for projects at the external borders. The second contemporary instrument that is 
incorporated in the new ENPI is the PHARE CBC program focusing on sub-regional 
cooperation between current member states and candidate countries and co-operation 
among candidate states. The third instrument is the MEDA program. This financial 
program was created as a result of the 1995 Barcelona declaration and the EMP (Euro-
Mediterranean partnership) and is focusing on closer relations between the European 
Union and its Mediterranean neighbouring states. Its objectives are supporting and 
providing assistance in the field of economic transition, regional integration and socio-
economic development with a budget of 5,350 million Euros for the period 2000-2006 
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(Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 3). The EMP used to be one of the most advanced and 
strongest institutionalised of the EU’s foreign policy partnerships based on socialisa-
tion, creating a network of cooperation with state and non-state actors across a remark-
ably range of policy areas, combined with a developmental agenda mainly focusing on 
poverty reduction, showing parallels with World Bank and IMF approaches (Emerson, 
Aydin et. al. 2005, 20, Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 4). The integration of the Barcelona 
declaration in the ENP has, according to the EU, result in a of Euro-Med relations to-
wards a system of ‘positive conditionality’ of rewards since past cooperation within the 
Barcelona Process has hardly led to create a greater extent of a shared understanding 
around democratic transformation and reform (most notably the ongoing failure of the 
Middle East Peace Process), and the southern member states were unwilling to apply 
active conditionality policies on their neighbours (COM 2005, Emerson, Aydin et. al. 
2005, 21, 33). The last financial instrument is the Tacis CBC program that facilitated 
projects on the eastern borders and the Northern Dimension of the EU particularly 
on the borders with Russia, Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine. These different programs 
and instruments are subjected to different complex procedures and according to the 
EU caused therefore difficulties to implement coherent projects between member states 
and neighbouring countries (COM 2003 393 final 6). 
As a consequence, the ENPI is the main financing and operational instrument to 
support the implementation of the ENP and its Action Plans and has been invented to 
improve the coherence and simplicity of procedures by brining together the existing 
financing instruments and responsible for management in terms of programming, 
control, monitoring and evaluation (COM, 2005). Despite its explicitness, the exact 
conditions to determine the allocation of the ENPI remain unclear and are vaguely 
defined and a source for speculation. Moreover, ongoing uncertainty over the EU’s 
future budget and the extensive lobby machines operating on behalf of the member-
states limit the scope for specifying the incentives on offer (Jones and Emerson, 2005, 
19). This speculation and vagueness indicate the immense bureaucratic machine 
concerning EU budgets and the actual funding processes. Preparation, reporting, 
evaluation again reporting cross-examination etc. all exemplify the un-user-friendly 
sources of funding and as the EU should stand for exploiting synergies and econo-
mies of scale, the EU’s financial regulation head towards the wrong direction, leading 
to diseconomies of scale (Emerson, Aydin et. al. 2005, 34).
A special new focus has been the attention for cross-border cooperation (CBC) pro-
jects and the development of integrated regional development within the ENPI. This 
can be seen as a strategy of bringing together regions of member states and neigh-
bouring countries sharing a common border and developing in the words of the EU 
‘An area of good “neighbourliness” and the avoidance of the creation of new dividing 
lines’ (COM 2004 628 final, 3). The main aim to achieve closer cross-border cooperation 
will be through promoting people-to-people contacts, community cooperation pro-
grammes in areas including youth, education, training, research, environment, culture 
and audio-visual via programs, projects and third party involvement. Action Plans will 
identify concrete openings for partner states to participate (COM 2004 373 final, 20). 
Regional cooperation initiatives so far have focused on common issues such as coopera-
tion in the field of economics, business, employment and social policy. Examples are 
joint infrastructure in environmental projects, cooperation of chambers of commerce, 
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employment regulation, poverty reduction and management of pollution. Other areas 
of regional CBC cooperation are justice and home affairs focusing on migration issues, 
border management and visa regulation and people-to-people issues, aiming at stimu-
lating civil society development, activities in the field of journalist and media exchange, 
academic and student exchange and cooperation in the field of culture, education, sci-
ence and other societal organisation (COM 2004 373 final, 21). 
the three p’s
The main features of the ENP are, according to the EU, the strengthening of the rela-
tions between the Union and its neighbouring states in order to create a prosperous and 
stable ring of friends around the European Union and to safeguard two of its strategic 
foreign policy priorities: avoiding short/medium-term further enlargement and how 
to manage the new external borders (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 241). The relation is not 
the same as it is between member states and candidate countries that are written under 
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The ENP countries are excluded from any 
medium and long-term accession and pre-accession processes. The main objective of 
the ENP is therefore to share the benefits of the countries within the EU to some extent 
with its neighbouring states. This is the chief interest of the EU itself as EU representa-
tives write: ‘Strengthening stability, security and well-being for all’ and prevent the 
emergence of new dividing lines. Moreover, the EU offers its neighbouring states a 
variety of programmes and activities aiming at increasing cooperation on economic, 
political and social issues. However, in return for this offer neighbouring states have 
to commit to certain European values as the rule of law, good governance, respect for 
human rights and good neighbourly relations (COM 2004 795 final, 2). These new chal-
lenges and opportunities concerning the new neighbourhood as the EU them observes 
are centred on three P’s; Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty.
proximity
Proximity relates to the geographical dimension of ‘nearness’ to the Union reflected 
through close associations and partnerships based on historical links and common 
values. However, in practice, geographical proximity relates to issues typified as the 
management of the external border, which aims on the one hand to promote cultural 
links and cross border cooperation and on the other hand management in combating 
mutual security threats. In the interest of the EU ‘border management’ suggests that it 
is security orientated, but formulated in a way that it emphasizes the positive aspects 
of relations with the involved neighbouring states. Therefore, security is defined by 
cooperation in various policy fields, including economic and social development and 
pursuing transnational cooperation. Or, in the words of Emerson (2004, 16), coopera-
tion in the sense that the new members of the EU ‘become special friends and mentors 
of selected neighbourhood partners and states or regions’. In this sense the European 
Union is creating a political understanding that has been built on the interdepend-
ence of economic, political and social/cultural concerns (Scott, 2005). The addressing 
of a ‘zone of security’ around the EU has been encouraged by the Seville European 
Council in 2002 and made concrete in the European Security Strategy adopted at the 
Brussels European Council in December 2003 (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 241). This 
more formal politics is revealed through ‘securitisation’. This concept is related to 
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various issues, concerning cooperation in the fields of justice and home-affairs, for 
example the institutionalization of efficient ‘border management’ in securing the 
European Union against terrorism, preventing drug smuggling, human trafficking 
and controlling illegal immigration (COM 2003 393 Final). 
prosperity and poverty
The other challenges and opportunities concerning the new neighbourhood reflect 
on issues like prosperity and poverty. By addressing these challenges the EU clearly 
regards its neighbouring states as economically less developed or developing countries 
(COM 2004 628 final). The EU has a clear interest in addressing the root causes of eco-
nomic vulnerability, political instability, institutional deficiencies, poverty and social 
exclusion to prevent political and economic destabilisation and political confrontation 
(COM, 2003 104 final). Consequently, as the European Neighbourhood Policy is begin-
ning to get its shape, economic integration, sustainable development and the accelera-
tion of economic growth of the neighbourhood becomes most notably the important 
issue on the EU’s agenda for the coming years. In tackling the root causes the EU seeks 
to provide its neighbours with increased financial and technical assistance, improve-
ment of the investment climate and foresee privileged trade relations by reducing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers and indirectly bringing the neighbouring states closer to the 
EU’s economic model (COM 2004 373 final). Although the EU mentions the neighbour-
ing countries as partners, the improvements of economic conditions and the connected 
benefits will not be implemented via the principle of equal dialogue but more as an 
offer to accept; as the actual delivery of reimbursements require implementation of 
agreed measures, structural reforms and policies not only based on capital movements 
liberalisation but also policies that address poverty and financing (COM 2004 373 final). 
3.2 TRANSITIONAL EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS 
The main objective behind the Neighbourhood policy suggests a certain security- 
orientated direction when taking the evolution of the ENP into account. The more 
traditional geopolitical orientated policies are formulated in a way that they empha-
sise the positive aspects of relations with the involved neighbouring states. In the 
vast anthology of European Union discourse contextualized in documents, papers 
and communication on the ENP the terms and language used have been carefully 
chosen and contains diplomatic narrative built on mediating bridge building axiom 
(with references to democratizing, the rule of law, modernization and transformation 
from within) in order to avoid any neo-imperial hegemonic suspicion and providing 
a normative foundation that can be found in the Kantian notion of eternal peace. 
But it is the in between lines however, that articulate ambiguous proprietary and 
realpolitik connotations as expressed in the use of the term interest in the internally 
policy based representations (Emerson, 2002, 13). This opens the discussion how the 
ENP must be interpreted when it proclaims of ‘sharing everything with the Union 
but institutions’, by meaning that through regulations and commitments European 
values are shared with neighbours in what Emerson (2004, 1) calls ‘Europeanization’ 
beyond the traditional western Europe. 
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The term ‘Europeanization’ appeared first at the European Summit in Copenhagen 
in 1993 in order to define accession criteria for candidate states before entering the EU, 
and has turned out to be a major motivation for candidate states to imply economic re-
forms and political transformation (Emerson, Noutcheva, 2005, 11). ‘Europeanization’ 
of the continent’s periphery is what Emerson (2004, 2) describes as ‘combining ra-
tional institutionalism through policies of conditionality, and sociological institu-
tionalism through norm diffusion and social learning’ and are made concrete in the 
ENP framework as democracy, good governance, the respect for human rights and 
minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, rule of law, and the 
principles of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development in order 
to start or speeding up the ‘Europeanization’ process in the EU’s ‘ring of friends’. 
Consequently, ‘Europeanization’ can be understood as a normative process of hook-
ing up with modern European norms and values through the interaction of three 
dynamics which can in their turn be divided into two complementing processes: 
conditionality and socialisation’ (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 4);
• The legal binding norms of the EU for democracy and human rights
• Transformation of objective interests of enterprises and individuals due to in-
creasing integration
• Transformation of subjective values and identities and the societal level
Rational institutional changes (conditionality) may occur within short or medium 
term when countries accept the legal obligations via the signing of Action Plans 
that have been classified by Prodi as the ‘Copenhagen proximity criteria’ a sort of 
Acquis for neighbouring countries. Consequently, through economic and political 
transformation and reform and the closer relationship with the EU objective changes 
can be seen as one of the mechanism of ‘Europeanization’. Emerson and Noutcheva 
(2005, 14, 15) identify three broad categories of conditionality: (1) Normal sectorial 
policy conditionality, which relate to every category of incentive offered to partner 
states involving all traditional sorts of aid and trade policies such as macro-economic 
aid, program aid, trade concessions and internal market access. Individual priorities 
are defined in the different Action Plans. (2) Negative conditionality – from sanc-
tioning, shaming, and war, may not be totally inappropriate for the ‘encouraging’ 
policies of the ENP, for example in the case of Belarus where authoritarian president 
Lukashenko and his parliament is not welcome anymore in the EU and his financial 
balances have been frozen after widespread fraud and intimidation. Sanctions may 
eventually encourage change and may be in strategic interest for the EU in order to 
act as a unanimous political entity. (3) Positive conditionality and incentives into 
overdrive aim at achieving overarching policy inducements in order to offer extra 
financial and technical support to partner states that are willing to reform faster and 
deeper, mostly partner states with eventual membership aspirations or with strong 
political and societal interests towards the EU (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005, 14, 15). 
But as positive conditionality remains unclear and not always credible in order to 
enforce or allow for a strong and strict process, socialization might well be its stronger 
brother. Subjective behavioural changes (socialisation) which are more deeply rooted 
and contextualised through identity, culture, ideas and convictions are less subjected 
for short-term transformation, and it will only be through the success of institutional 
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transformation, than in the long run societal transformation will succeed only if civil 
society in the involved countries is willing to adopt European values, norms and 
politics and thus fits itself into further ‘Europeanization’ (Emerson, 2004, 2). This can 
be reached through the idea to explain in a friendly manner what the EU’s model of 
governance is and to recommend that partner states learn about it and eventually 
hook up with it, in this the proximity and attractiveness of the EU is of importance 
since socialization worked well with an eventual membership promise (the ‘return 
to Europe’ idea) but could in this case be perceived as an aggressive form of foreign 
policy and imply counterproductive tendencies especially in the Arab neighbour-
hood (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005, 16). 
The process of expanding ‘Europeanization’ to its neighbourhood and beyond the 
candidate states is a model based on what the Brussels think-tank CEPS calls the geo-
politics of ‘soft-power’ that the EU applies as a strategic instrument and which has a 
strong normative democratic essence, and simultaneously relates to the empowerment 
of EU institutions (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005,1). It makes effective use of its democratic 
quality and reputation and the attractiveness of its open market and highly developed 
democracies in their intention to develop liberal engagement (Emerson and Noutcheva, 
2005, 20). The willingness of neighbouring states to join or be part of this liberal demo-
cratic centre depends on its proximity and openness. When economic and political 
integration into the centre is possible and not completely restricted by closed borders 
but by a certain freedom of movement, shared border management, visa regulation etc. 
then the process can become one of conditionality with commitments to be made on the 
high standards of liberal democracy whereby further progress and ongoing politico-
economic transition and reform will be rewarded with deeper inclusion into the core of 
the democratic centre and consequently the borders of the internal and external can be 
softened (Emerson, 2004, 5). However, as Emerson (2002) observes, there are existential 
threats to be curbed, when keeping in mind the contemporary fear of international ter-
rorism, and therefore ENP geopolitics associates in a sense also to a more hard-line kind 
of security politics. This more hard form of politics is revealed through 'securitisation'. 
This concept is related to various issues, concerning cooperation in the fields of justice 
and home-affairs, for example the institutionalisation of efficient border management 
in securing the European Union against terrorism, preventing drug smuggling, human 
trafficking and controlling illegal immigration (COM, 2003 393 Final). Moreover, secu-
ritisation according to EU documents means the prevention of political and economic 
destabilisation and political confrontation. These policies are extensively worked out in 
the various Action Plans and enable the EU to classify the neighbourhood into different 
zones (for example the zones of concern typified by weak state structures, democratic 
deficits or organised cross border crime). Progress is measured and defined clarified by 
the following quotations: ‘overall the pace of reforms has slowed particularly in demo-
cratic reforms and human rights standards’ (COM 188/3 (2009), 2). And: ‘the overall lack 
of progress on governance issues observed in 2008 underlines the need for the EU and 
its partners to redouble their efforts, both with intensified political dialogue and with 
tailored assistance, including the Governance Facility which remains an important 
political incentive’ (COM 188/3 (2009), 11). 
But the contradiction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power seemingly have lead to a 
series of problems; the ‘soft power’ strategy worked wonderfully well with the can-
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didate states in the immediate proximity of the EU and with long geo-historical ties 
to the democratic centre of the EU. This is different for the wider Europe countries. 
As soon as the wider Europe initiative got into construction the first critical com-
ments and resistances floated to the surface. Critical voices argued that the EU now 
had defined its very own empire like cosmos creating its own ‘Schmittean gross-
raum’. In broader terms the EU’s Wider Europe intention was understood by its critics 
as a reaction on the enlargement process, whereby its power weakened with every 
‘concentric circle’ further away from its epicentre of Brussels (see for example Aalto 
2002, 144), or in other terms a subversive ‘empire’ like core-periphery model. These 
circles represent a hierarchy of categories, qualified by the character of the affiliation 
with the EU: the newly accessed candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) the future candi-
dates (Balkans), the European neighbours that aspire membership (Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldavia and Armenia), the Mediterranean neighbours with no accession prospec-
tive (Tunisia, Morocco), Turkey with a separate status and Russia with its special 
strategic partnership. What this seems to suggest is that the higher the hierarchy, the 
more dominated by the Copenhagen Criteria and the execution hands of Brussels’ 
‘conditionality machine’ (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 29). Emerson (2003, 4) calls this 
the ‘cobweb system’ of concentric circles around the leading power, Brussels, as with 
around every circle a system of multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations with 
Brussels. The ‘Rubik cube system’ can be added as a second system representing the 
strategic partnership with Russia, representing multiple leading centres. 
The significance of both securitisation and cooperation and partnership is in itself 
paradoxical and can be seen as a possible source of concern (I have explained this in the 
introduction). The paradox of Wider Europe is expressed by competing validations for 
establishing a neighbourhood of stability, prosperity and security, made visible in vari-
ous policies regarding migration issues, visa regimes, citizenship issues and access to 
labour markets. Besides, the thin line between membership and partnership is contro-
versial. Countries on the eastern edge of Europe like Ukraine, Belarus and the southern 
Caucasus have no prospects of joining the European Union in the foreseeable future. 
Former colonial countries with strong socio-economic and political ties to Europe, like 
Morocco and Tunisia have never been considered serious candidates for future EU 
membership. Therefore, barriers of exclusion (be it political, cultural or social) operate 
parallel with partnership policies of inclusion aiming at economic, political and social 
development and creating a zone of prosperity (Scott, 2005).   
The process faced with internal contradictions is holding back the EU’s particu-
lar role. One possible explanation can be found in the contradictions that are related 
to certain geopolitical sensitivities of the individual member states (See box below). 
These sensitive issues reflect subjective syndromes like different proximities and his-
torical processes with various involved states and partners and conflicting visions of 
Europe, its direction and worldviews. Traditional state-centred geopolitics still play 
an important role in this, since northern and southern member states have different 
economic and political and ideological ‘tactical’ agendas concerning their immediate 
neighbourhood, for example, on issues related to the opening of markets, critical com-
ments of neighbours’ democratic performances, post-colonial sensitivities and the aver-
sion to enforce political conditionality (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 22, 30). One of the 
recent tactical differences concern the aim of the ENP, where the northern and new 
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eastern member states regard the ENP as a framework to ensure closer cooperation 
with European states in the east that are currently without any short-term perspec-
tive on membership, while the southern member states are pushed for more inclusion 
and ongoing integration within the southern Mediterranean both camps strongly dif-
fer on financial sources and other funding resources (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 23). 
These contradictory visions make it difficult for the EU to obtain a democratic foreign 
policy agenda based on promoting democracy and at the same time ‘Europeanization’ 
(Emerson, Aydin et.al. (2005,1). For some this stagnating process provides a source for 
conventional wisdom about the EU’s international impotence (Aalto, 2002, 144). 
The geopolitical differences of member states with regard to the ENP may well be 
related to the deepest institutional tension affecting the foreign policies of the EU and 
that are the geopolitical visions of the EU itself; to prioritize Europe’s power and iden-
tity and to bring further enlargement to a complete stop, or the extension of European 
Democracy up to 30 or 40 member states. Parallel on this cleavage are arguments con-
cerning the ungovernability of the EU and its cultural identity (particularly with regard 
to Turkey and the inclusion of a large Muslim population). So far the ENP can be seen 
as a continuation of the cleavage status-quo since EU political western-liberal values are 
prominently featured in the ENP and Action Plans which the involved neighbours leave 
them little more than to apply voluntary to the near Copenhagen Criteria and with that 
the EU neither shuts nor opens the accession door (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 31, 32). 
Several syndromes and cleavages among the EU’s member states
Preferences from geography
• North prefers North
• South prefers South
Sensitivities of former colonial powers:
• France and Spain towards the Maghreb
• Austria towards the Balkans
Sensitivities of the formerly colonized or occupied
• Baltic and Central European states towards Russia
Sensitivities from World War II
• Germany towards Israel and Russia
Alternative European visions
• A united democratic Europe
• A powerful, controllable core Europe
Alternative World Views
New Europe Atlanticism
Old Europe Gaullism
Source: (Emerson, Aydin et.al. (2005, 6)
Figure 3: Several syndromes and cleavages
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3.3 SCHOLARLY CONSIDERATIONS ON EUROPEAN 
GEOPOLITICS 
In the context of an emerging European geopolitics, it is important to note how the 
EU’s role as a geo-political institution has been conceptualised within the state of the 
scholarly debate, in order to define its geopolitical steps within the broader discipline 
of geography. The section interferes upon two dominant assumptions among schol-
ars and experts of geopolitical processes within the European Union that take into 
consideration the changing circumstance of the transformation of European borders. 
1.) The first geopolitical assumption centres on the idea that the EU is in a continu-
ous pragmatic process of ordering its geopolitical space through defining itself, its 
neighbours, and its complex multilateral and bilateral relations. Moreover, it is in an 
ongoing interactive negotiation process in which the EU itself is changing through 
enlargement and developing relations with its neighbours and consequently empha-
sizing the ‘post-national’ connotation of the non-fixity of the borders of Europe (Scott, 
2005, 434, Aalto, 2002, 150). This scholarly debate seeks answers to the changes taking 
place within European geopolitics in the shift from Hobbessian state-centred debates 
to a European project of different scales and multi-layers as has been discussed in 
the previous section. For example, Jan Zielonka (2001) has contributed to this debate 
by expressing the evolution of a new European Framework. It is this debate that 
focuses on the growing dominance of the European entity on political, economic 
and cultural issues. This so called 'post-Westphalian' notion of Europe centres on a 
changing Europe and challenges the state as a sovereign control centre. This model of 
overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements 
and multiple identities focussing on interdependencies have been taken over by many 
other scholars.  Interpretations of the concept used to capture these debates vary from 
'post-modern' to 'post-national', questioning singular identity politics and theorising 
the upcoming Europe of multiple decision making centre's and multiple layers of 
scale (Among them the groundbreaking work in this field by Diez (2002), Emerson 
(2002, 2005), Zielonka (2001) and Paasi (2002, 2001, 1996).  
Thomas Diez (2002, 7-9) in particular gives several careful motivations for his 
idea of Europe as a ‘post-national polity’. The first is that the EU allows for multiple 
representations. Sub-national regional entities have their own voice, for example in 
various councils, as long as they are authorised to do so on behalf of the entire mem-
ber state, which allows for a multi-tier structure. The second reason is that within the 
EU, sovereignty is not seen as an absolute concept. EU regulations undermine any 
absolute ideas about internal sovereignty. The third reason is that the EU can foster 
a sense of multiple identities. The notion of shared sovereignty goes hand in hand 
with the acknowledgement of multiple identities and co-ownership. The process of 
‘Europeanization’ can be regarded as an additional form of citizenship. Argument 
number four is that special EU funds can be utilised to undermine borders. According 
to Diez (2002 7-9), reducing the significance of borders between member-states has 
always been a core ethos of European integration. The last motivation is that transi-
tion periods and deregulations have in the past demonstrated the EU’s sensitivity to 
community identities. The intention of 'wider Europe' in promoting shared values 
and prosperity and avoiding new lines of division and exclusiveness is present in this 
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scholarly debate, however to speak of the notion of a new emerging post-Westphalian 
geopolitics of inclusiveness and corresponding agendas of moving away from tradi-
tional nation-states remains ambiguous.
Within this ‘post-national’ empirical context of the ENP the EU has been defined 
through the conceptual concept of ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ as described by political 
scientist Pami Aalto in his 2002 publication in Geopolitics. In this the EU is concep-
tualized as geopolitical ‘subject’ instead of ‘agent’ or ‘actor’, since subject leaves space 
for both the ability to act and at the same time to abstain from acting in another 
particular context and therefore allowing for third party subjects to recognize the 
EU as both an able and legitimate subject and as an internally weak constitution of 
subjectivity not wanting the EU to respond through any goal-orientated action in par-
ticular situations (Aalto, 2002, 148). Aalto classifies this ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ as 
a process of ordering. He defines it in the following way: ‘goal orientated ordering of 
territories and political spaces, extending from one’s own sphere of sovereign rule to 
broader regional contexts’ (Aalto, 2002, 148). Aalto structures his ‘geopolitical subjec-
tivity’ framework on the notion that Gerard O’Tuathail and John Agnew (1992/2005) 
make on geopolitics and discourse in understanding the complex processes around 
contemporary geopolitical processes as the EU, which itself consist of a multifac-
eted interplay between various actors, institutions and discourses. Aalto’s ‘geopo-
litical subjectivity’ brings together four theses defined by O’Tuathail and Agnew 
(1992/2005, 81, 82) on conceptualizing critical geopolitics. The first thesis they opt is 
formal geopolitical reasoning by strategic thinkers and public intellectuals which are 
professionally embedded into civil society producing a complex codified system of 
formalized ideas and principles to channel the performances of statecraft. The second 
is practical geographical reasoning based on discourse that depends on narratives 
and binary distinctions constructed through societal folklore that gives meaning to 
places, performed and made operational by politicians and political leaders. The third 
thesis is the production, reproduction and modification of geopolitical reasoning by 
media, education and others through a cross transfer of geopolitical, geographical 
knowledge and reasoning and the common sense meaning of both. The last thesis the 
authors use is the operation of geopolitical reasoning in the world-system and how 
influence and power is represented by competition for hegemony in the international 
political space.
In this meta-concept of ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ the EU member states have re-
mained the principles based on recognition of geopolitical interdependence (Scott, 
2005, 433). The Commission and the Council’s High Representative for Foreign 
and Security Policy have been the agents of the principles and thus representing 
the inter-subjective geopolitical character of the union, of whom the council’s High 
Representative has the least institutional power as he is the tightest controlled agent 
(Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 32). Thus, the EU’s capacities to portray itself as a geo-
political subject depends to a large extend on its member states’ recognition of this 
connotation. Yet, the EU can be best regarded as an unfinished and ongoing construc-
tion process that among other things takes the form of a geopolitical subject; not 
necessarily subjectivity represented simultaneously by all member states. In some 
cases the EU has the ascendancy; in other situations or circumstances only the most 
powerful member states have it (Aalto, 2002, 155).  
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From this definition three associations can be made with the EU/ENP strategy. 
The first connection is that ordering is always goal-orientated in means and aims of 
creating a certain desirable social and material relation. In the case of the rational 
goal behind the ENP ordering can be seen as extending the ‘EU order’ via the process 
of ‘Europeanization’ instrumentalised through social learning and other forms of 
socialization that are aimed at promoting and stimulating democracy and European 
values in order to increase its security interests and to avoid political confrontation 
and destabilizing regional conflicts (Scott, 2005, 435, Aalto, 2002, 149). These two goals 
always feature in the discourse, and in the long run democracy and security are 
viewed as being almost synonymous (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005, 32).
The second connection Aalto describes, relates to the fact that EU ordering prac-
tices allow for different spatial geopolitical contextualizations and multi-tier struc-
tures. The EU’s concentric core-periphery ‘cobweb system’/ Rubik cube system’ which 
extends from its core old-Europe to new-Europe and ‘wider Europe including Russia 
and with every category of circles a different complex set of systems of multilateral re-
lations as well as bilateral relations with Brussels. These relations are contextualized 
in the different existing financing instruments, programs and regulations responsible 
for management, financing, programming, controlling, monitoring and evaluating. 
These more regional programs allow geopolitical subjects to vary from non-sovereign 
sub national, national or trans national groups to states and state actors that are able 
to order their spheres of influence and their immediate neighbourhood as well (Aalto, 
2002, 149).
The third EU/ENP connection deriving from the ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ defini-
tion is power, which is contextualized through positive and negative conditionality, 
which is another aspect of the ‘Europeanization’ process. Negative power refers to 
sanctions or eventually to military action, but can also be understood as a counter-
productive conditionality as the eventual outcome of the tight criteria for the different 
Action Plans may turn out to have a negative effect on partner states since the ulti-
mate rewards will not lead to EU membership. Positive conditionality may be reached 
through the mutual character of the Action Plans as well as the EU offer for additional 
financial and practical support to partner states that are willing to reform faster and 
dive deeper into European values (Aalto, 2002, 149). In this third connection the com-
mission has become the agent that has been acquiring such extensive mandates and 
instruments of action that it partly turned into a principal of its own in the promotion 
and execution of the ‘conditionality machine’ (Emerson, Aydin et.al. 2005,32).    
The ambiguity regarding the ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ of the EU stands out in the 
major contradictions that result from tension between formal ‘Realpolitik’ emphasized 
by policies of conditionality and socialization on the one hand and everyday simultane-
ous processes of inclusion and exclusion on the other (Scott, 2005, 445). This relates to 
the fact that geopolitical discourses and subsequent policies refer to a sufficient degree 
of institutionalization that enables effective implementation. The problem however, is 
that the ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ of the various EU/national/non-national institutions 
putting forth formal, practical and popular geopolitical discourses are competing and 
not coherent. This is emphasised by the fact that the ENP on the one hand allows for 
securitisation, which means the prevention of political and economic destabilisation 
and political confrontation, tight border regimes and strict visa and migration regula-
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tion and police control (critics would speak of ‘Fortress Europe’) and at the same time 
a politics of cooperation and dialogue with joint ownership, a stake in the internal 
EU market and common European values (Scott, 2005, 445). The significance of both 
securitisation and cooperation is in itself paradoxical and can be seen as a possible 
source of concern. The paradox of Wider Europe is expressed by competing objectives 
for establishing a neighbourhood of stability, prosperity and security. The EU has not 
a good record when its comes to formal geopolitics and its institutions lack a coherent 
tool-box and mandate to effectively order its influence spheres. Consequently the con-
tradiction of securitisation versus cooperation within the ENP will not be sorted out 
without leading to new and forms of inclusion and exclusion.  
In line with this, the second dominant assumption in theorizing the evolutional 
geopolitics of the EU focuses on the idea that it is highly unlikely that a supranational 
overlapping European Union identity will replace national identities and recognise 
the ambiguity towards the objectives of the European Union's notion of wider Europe. 
Agnew (2001, 2005), Amin (2003), Böröcz and Kovacs (2001), Brenner (2000) Pickels 
(2005), Minca (2003, 2005), Hakli and Kaplan (2002) Kramsch (2006a and 2006b) Engel-
Di Mauro, 2006; Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006), Newman and Paasi, 1998), Mitchell 
(1997), Paasi (2001), Scott (2009, 2005), Scott and van Houtum (2009), Sparke (2002, 2000), 
Swyngedouw (2010, 2000) are among these scholars. Their concerns are far more focused 
on the traditional geopolitical motivations of the EU. Here the territorial ambitions of 
the EU are considered problematic and reflect on the strengthening of the external 
borders and the consequences for neighbouring states. The critiques of these scholars 
seem mainly based on a different notion of sovereignty in the contextual meaning of 
Europe, not the subsidiary version of sovereignty stands central in their critiques but 
the notion of Empire (empire as featured in the 2000 homonymous book by Antonio 
Negri and Michael Hardt) as process at work in Europe became the main theorized 
focus in the critique. Through this perspective, ‘post-National’ connotations applied 
to an understanding of cross-border dynamics have become increasingly problematic, 
allowing EU member states to subject themselves voluntarily to supra-national authori-
ties, while maintaining completely heterogeneous attitudes with respect to traditional 
aspects of sovereignty (border management, migration issues, monetary policies and 
military alliances) and consequently the exclusive analytical focus on socially con-
structed representations of nationalising self/other relations (Boedeltje et al. 2006, 33). 
Against this background Luiza Bialasiewitcz et al. (2009, 83) recently mentioned 
the growing belief among European elites that Europe can actually be made or at least 
reshaped. In particular, the term neighbour/neighbourhood/wider Europe has gained 
much attention in critical debate. And, although Europe and the EU are two different 
concepts, they increasingly seem connected, interchanged and even confused, which 
makes the question of ‘what Europe actually is—or is not—an urgent one. This mix 
of different connotations of Europe and the often misleading distinction between the 
metaphors Europe and the European Union (EU) have not remained unnoticed by 
political geographers. 
The gradual confusion about the status of Europe was already noticed in the mid 
1980s. It was Roger Lee (1985) who wrote about the distinctions between experienced, 
structural and institutional versions of Europe. The major questions that arose out of 
this discussion are, in a way, how the institutional version of Europe (as represented 
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by the EU) has surpassed the structural and experienced versions of Europe. Lee sug-
gested that the institutional version of Europe tempts to exclude local and historical 
elements or at best solely seen as abstractions that have lost all their social content.      
 Recently James Anderson et al. (2009, 86) have rightly observed that the European 
Union is not the same as Europe. He added: ‘Too much is claimed for it’, making the 
metaphors ‘misleadingly self-congratulatory’. According to another distinguished po-
litical geographer John Agnew the misleading distinction is based on the mixing-up 
of the ‘idea’ Europe and ‘project’ Europe. The ‘idea’ refers to subjective State construc-
tion. It operates through the canonization of history supported by imaginations of 
feeling, belonging and identity. ‘Project’ Europe, on the other hand, refers to politics in 
which formal treaties between states have led to the European economic common space 
and eventually to the partnership of today. ‘Project’ Europe is regulated, formalized 
and can be traced. As any other organization, it has ‘founding fathers’. Schumann and 
Monet are regarded as those who made the EU possible (Agnew, 2005, 578). It is impor-
tant to remark that ‘project’ Europe as a partnership based on multilateral cooperation 
made no claims on geographical or historical togetherness (see also Boedeltje and van 
Houtum forthcoming, 2011). In line with this Bialasiewicz and Minca (2005) once sug-
gested that many scholars working on the European project depart from the meaning 
that the European Union provided and what it constructed made sense to them and 
thus might confuse the connotations and claims about Europe. 
Implicit in all these question remains whether the EU can succeed in establishing 
a flexible politics based on mutuality and local concern through a system of multilat-
eral and bilateral multi-tier dialogue rather than one of top-down, hard ‘empire-like’ 
security orientated self-interest through a one-sided tight conditionality machine and 
a politics inspired by an internally orientated security rationale. In other words, will 
according to the critics a regionalized, decentralized EU prevail over the ‘empire’ like 
core-periphery EU. 
3.4 CONSIDERING CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS
After analyzing the conceptual and evolutional transition of European geopolitics 
within the broader context of the study of geopolitics, I read an important and ongo-
ing role for critical geography and the sub-discipline of critical geopolitics. The criti-
cal approaches as reflected by respected political geographers like Laikinen, Aalto, 
Scott, Agnew and others are indeed valuable critiques on European geopolitics of 
the past decade and reflect the complex, heterogeneous and confusing idea of a con-
temporary Europe that cannot be fitted in a simple policy or definition: A Europe of 
complexity instead of generalization. 
The example of the European Neighbourhood Policy seems to indicate that the 
current status of Europe relates increasingly to a complex singularity inspired by 
the rather Eurocentric belief that the neighbouring states can be ‘Europeanized’ (the 
promotion of particular European values like democracy, market economy, minor-
ity/human rights etc.) through a fuzzy mix of traditional and alternative geopolitical 
methods such as conditionality and socialization without the prospective of becom-
ing EU members. Moreover, its subjective status keeps on allowing confusing policies 
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and practices of simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion. These transitions 
have provoked an appeal for a different and more critical geopolitics (O’Tuathail, 
2010, Anonsich, 2009, Hyndman, 2010). The duality between the generalizing policies 
and the often contradicting local realities seem to have a disturbing effect not only 
on neighbouring states but also on Europe itself, torn between John Agnew’s ‘idea’ 
and  ‘project’ and the geopolitical randomness of Pami Aalto’s concept of geopolitical 
subjectivity. The tensions between on the one hand a generalizing ‘EU-topia’ and on 
the other hand a heterogeneous ‘heterotopias’ arising from the gap between political 
imaginations and empirical reality are embodied by the question where the ideal 
version of Europe ends, and where it begins. 
From my own point of view I share the belief that it is highly unlikely that a su-
pranational overlapping European Union identity will replace national identities. In 
fact, I believe that the new external policy is not so much an example of overlapping 
European identities but far more an ordinary copy of national identities transport-
ed to ‘wider Europe’. In this sense traditional geopolitics is still very much alive in 
Europe. By copying the Hobbesian nation-state model onto the neighbouring state, 
the EU seems not very keen of take away the worries of those who believe that the EU 
is building a new empire. I believe that critical geographers are in the positions to take 
into account the contradictory circumstances of European geopolitics by confronting 
European geopolitics with its own simplicity, contradictions and fuzziness. In this 
perspective, Jennifer Hyndman (2010, 317) remarks how difficult it is to speak outside 
normative discourse when taking into account that hegemonic discourse tempts to 
consider normal people as ‘right-bearing liberal subjects who are part of a discourse 
of universal principles’. But, despite this difficult task, this dissertation reflects the 
question of how critical geopolitics could function as resistance to dominant dis-
course by means of foreseeing scenarios that reflect the daily lives of people across 
Europe affected by European geopolitics. I believe that critical geographers are in 
the positions to take into account the changing circumstances of European geopoli-
tics by engaging the political as spaces of resistance, places that resist the dominant 
state-centred narratives that subvert reality and that confront politics with their own 
homogeneity. It is inherent to the discipline of critical geopolitics that it has provided 
a progressive (‘radical’) space for political geographers in exploring different direc-
tions away from geography that helped to establish a rich and creative literature on 
the resistance to dominant and hegemonic political visions. These shifts indicate 
that critical geopolitics of Europe today have fewer answers, but raises more ques-
tions instead. In that powerful change where questions become more important than 
answers, I will follow a critical grounded geographical approach that takes the lives 
of people that are constituted through a specific normative discourse either because 
of their deviant character and ‘otherness’ or their specific place in society as central 
focus. I believe that critical geopolitics should be able to open up contesting political 
representations by seeing people beyond their constituted political classifications 
as European and non-European, neighbour, immigrant, good or bad. As O’Tuathail 
(2010, 2) remarked earlier, this way of seeing indeed ‘disaggregates rather than ho-
mogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather than globalizes analysis and 
explanation’. It is here that an integer interpretation of complex lives of people can be 
a powerful means to make a difference. 
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4 Homogeneous Europe: EU-
TOPIA 
4.1 THE FABRICATION OF EU-TOPIA 
As the previous chapters have clarified, the implications of the geopolitical ambigu-
ity in European geopolitics are particularly represented in two divergent imaginary 
visions of Europe. As mentioned in the research objective these are: EU-topia (the 
homogeneous political view as represented in EU policies, discourses and practices) 
and Heterotopia (the heterogeneous view from below). The subsequent chapters in-
vestigate both visions in order to grasp the ‘nature’ of the paradox of simultaneous 
processes of inclusion and exclusion in European geopolitics.
Although the idea of EU-topia is, to some extent, present in policies and practices, 
it originates on the level of ideology. Not so much in its traditional banal meaning, 
but more embodied by the ‘fabrication’ of a symbolic idea. This next chapter makes a 
careful analysis of the construction of the EU-topia. How it foresees a distinct future 
for Europe and how it foresees its ideal. Although, the question of what Europe is – 
or should be – fits the characteristics of a utopian vision, it nonetheless appears in a 
rather clear political vision by the European Union. Gail Lewis (2006, 89) has written 
an interesting article on what she calls ‘the symbolic struggle over what it means to 
be European, where Europe begins and ends, who can stand for and be of Europe 
and the European (who) has assumed a far-reaching intensity’. Her perspective of 
Europe is interesting from the point of view of seeing Europe as both an ideological 
idea and an idea that has exceeded itself in the projection of an idealistic political 
project (the EU). She specifies the idea more on the side of ideology. In this context the 
ideal Europe functions as a ‘symbolic construct organizing individual and collective 
imaginings as to Europe’s peoples, behaviours, morality, world-views, institutional 
forms and geographical borders’ (Lewis 2006, 91). The exceeding ideological idea is 
reflected in the political project in which a ‘zone’ is constructed. This European zone 
is materialized in an active bordering regime in which active lines of demarcation 
mark the end and the beginning of Europe. From this perspective, which to some 
extent has been described by Aalto (2002) as ‘geopolitical subjectivity’, there seems to 
be a general belief among certain European elites of the existence of a symbolic basis 
of a particular Europe, on which policies are based (European Union). 
The fabrication of the symbolic is particularly reflected in two examples. The 
first example relates to an event that occurred in 2007. That particular year in many 
ways was a milestone for the European Union as it celebrated its 50th anniversary. 
The celebrations marked the fifty years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome on 
25 March 1957, which among European elites is regarded as the beginning of the EU. 
This celebration was decorated by a whole series of events and projects during 2007 
and 2008. Examples of the celebrations were the introduction of Europe day and a 
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series of European branding events ‘Europe in your pocket’, ‘Euro visions’, ‘desti-
nation Europe’, ‘Europe in-transit’, ‘upload your Europe’, ‘getting on the European 
train’, ‘Your Europe Your future’, ‘Setting Europe to Music’, ‘Europeans take the Stage’, 
‘United in Europe’, ‘How Erasmus changed my life’, ‘Imaging Europe’, ‘Europe a 
Cultural Commonwealth’, ‘From Common Market to People’s Europe’, ‘European art 
knows no boundaries’, ‘On the Frontline of Democracy’ etc. One special element of 
this commonness is expressed in the special logo that has been designed particularly 
for this extraordinary occasion. The design of the logo cannot hide the forced char-
acter of the whole enterprise. The word in Anglo-Saxon, the German umlaut on the 
O and the French accent aigu on the E insist that we should not forget the limited 
diversity of Europe, of which it is so proud. Obvious the word together, emphases its 
dialectic antonym alone and individually because between all the languages, accents, 
regions and colours, he is called to become consume®. 
In this way philosopher Slavoj Zizek (2005, IR, 241) speaks of a ‘fantasmatic spec-
tre’ that fills the gap between the imaginations and empirical reality with images 
fantasises, symbols and appearances that represent a certain politics. Here Europe 
has become a product or a brand, which can be desired. There is a rich tradition of 
authors referring to the fabrication of meaning across various academic disciplines. 
For example French philosopher Alain Badiou (2005, 2006) refers to Europe as end-
less multiplicity filled with meaning and substance. In his philosophy, Europe can 
never be presented as a single entity because it can never exclude anything that is also 
Europe. As soon as Europe is fabricated, it is closed to any alternative vision. In this 
perspective, the brand Europe always remains an entity filled with a selective inter-
pretation. Badiou (2005, 2006) continues by referring to a contemporary capital ideol-
ogy behind today’s western politics. Although capitalism consequently denies itself 
as ideology, for him, it has presented itself in two ways. The first is the appearance of 
an economic moral on which European politics is based. Humanitarian interventions 
(for example conditionality politics towards EU neighbouring states) are justified in 
name of neo-liberal values. Second is the totality of this ideology, exemplified by the 
domination of the economy and the limited space for alternative ideas. From the neo-
liberal viewpoint, alternatives that do not follow the logics of capitalism are among 
many economists and most politicians considered utopian. The ideological motiva-
tion is given in by maintaining its market economy competitive. 
In a different context, Etienne Balibar discussed the difficulties of a single fabricate 
called Europe. Balibar (2009, 210) recently termed Europe ` borderland Europe', starting 
with the idea that a political space could (and perhaps should) be imagined in terms 
of overlapping open regions. In which he furthermore suggests that the interior and 
exterior are no longer entirely separable. For him Europe as ‘borderland’ is the name of 
an imagined place where the opposites flow into one another and where the internal 
and the external have moved beyond and within European soil. Moreover, Balibar 
(2009, 209, 207) remarks that ‘a great deal in the future of Europe as a “community of 
citizens” depends on whether and to what extent the mass of citizens in Europe will 
have access to this practice which represents their real “common' idiom”’ instead of 
a symbolic fabrication based on selective historical connotations. With access Balibar 
means to what extent this idiom is translatable (in which he remarks that linguistic 
difference has become one of the most sensitive marks of ‘collective identity’.) 
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 Zygmunt Bauman wrote extensively on Europe, which he once called an ‘unfin-
ished adventure’. Bauman (2000, 87) remarks that in neo-liberal dominated societies 
like Europe, identities are increasingly fluid. He remarks that ‘the loose, “associative” 
status of identity, the opportunity to “shop around”, to pick and shed one’s “true self”, 
to “be on the move”, has come in present day consumer society to signify freedom. 
Consumer choice is now a value in its own right; the activity of choosing matters 
more than what is being chosen, and the situations are praised or are censured, 
enjoyed or resented depending on the range of choices on display’. Europe is filled 
with products, being itself a product, a brand, a desire. Bauman (2004, 2/4): Like all 
facts of the matter, Europe is expected, in defiance of everything that made it what it 
has become, to be a reality that could (should?) be located, taken stock of and filed. 
In an age of territoriality and territorial sovereignty, all realities are presumed to be 
spatially defined and territorially fixed - and Europe is no exception. Neither is the 
“European character”, nor the “Europeans” themselves.’ 
 This in a sense relates to the geography of desire as mentioned by Deleuze and 
Guattari. In Anti-Oedipus (1983), the authors take ‘the production of desire as a (…) 
primary force, a free-floating energy, immanent and unconscious, uniting nature with 
humans conceptualized as “desiring machines”. (…) Desire is a dynamic machine 
(“desiring production”), producing things, running in discontinuous flows, making 
connections with objects and other desiring machines’ (Deleuze and Guattari. cited in 
Peet, 1998, 211). From this position, the branding of Europe can be explained through 
the desire for geopolitical clarity. The politics of desire by the EU can be read as a self-
defined geopolitics that begins with a process of ‘othering’ and defining its borders. It 
then produces power statements and power statements produce difference between 
time and space (our time and our space versus their time and space). This is finalized 
by the ‘container-ization’ of people (van Houtum, 2006 unpublished lecture).
 The second example of a distinct territorial desire was the major exhibition on 50 
years of Europe titled:
source: EU-Website
Figure 4: Celebrating Europe!
‘Celebrating our history! 50 years of the European adventure’. The exhibition opened 
on October 26, 2007 and was planned to serve as a foundation for a permanent exhibi-
tion of the history of Europe, which was to be opened within the newly constructed 
EU parliament in Brussels. When the exhibition opened it was characterized as ‘The 
“place of memory” that Europe needs, (offering) all Europeans (and their guests) a 
reasoned history of a union portrayed as a diverse but unique civilisation’ (taken 
from the folder of the exhibition).  
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The exhibition has been designed with a touch of entertainment with visual and 
auditory elements that ‘touches the heart as well as the mind, to make you, the audi-
ence, not only think, but also feel’. The multimedia bites flash, in the style of video-
clips, a confusing mix of messages on the diversity of European culture, language 
and traditions, common values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for hu-
man rights, and equality on celebration, remembrance, re-building, integration, and 
expansion from six to 27 countries. 
The visit exposes the everyday life of ‘ordinary’ Europeans. Twenty-seven ordi-
nary representatives of Europe guide the visitors through the exhibition, which is one 
person of each member state of the Union. All stories start in 1945 after World War II. 
The exhibition follows their fate. These individual stories are more or less dramati-
cally linked to the grand narratives of EU history, leading from ‘efforts of the "Fathers 
of Europe" to rebuild a continent in the throes of decolonization’ to the ‘downfall of 
Western dictatorships, revolutions in everyday life and of a Cold War between East 
and West’. The exhibitions continue with the traditional marker of the contemporary 
EU, which is the fall of the Berlin Wall and ends with today’s Europe, which is ‘natu-
rally riddled with questions about the future of European construction and with 
the challenges that are facing Europeans at the beginning of the 21st century’ (again 
from the folder of the exhibition). As such accumulation the exhibition is a carefully 
constructed collection that not so much aims at exposing the reality of Europe, but a 
desired reality of the EU. This was perhaps unintentionally emphasized in the folder 
of the museum stating that the exhibition was still only a project that had ‘germinated 
in the minds’ of a small group of historians and cultural promoters from civil society. 
What this exhibition and celebration of Europe indicates relates to Bauman’s (2004, 
2/4) diagnosis that ‘Europe is not something you discover; Europe is a mission – some-
thing to be made, created, built. And it takes a lot of ingenuity, sense of purpose and 
hard labour to accomplish that mission’. When taking this in mind, the unification 
of Europe provided contemporary EU the political means in completing its desired 
image. The 27 stories in the exhibition are linked by common historical events lead-
ing to a bond of EU membership. However, the consequence of a common history by 
membership is that Europe only exists in the 27 EU countries with a ‘common histo-
ry’. Those who are outside or even the neighbours do not officially share this history. 
Celebrating Europe seems therefore to represent a dream of territorial togetherness, 
which in itself is not problematic. However, in combination with the political anniver-
sary of 50 years and a personal visit of European Commission president Barosso the 
political value gains a peculiar meaning, certainly when keeping in mind that spaces 
of desire are especially located in the zone of overlap between ideal imaginaries and 
real actions (see also Boedeltje 2011 under review). 
4.2 SPACES OF DESIRE
In the process of writing I came across a very good article written by Annemarie 
Pieper in which she describes the conceptual background of a European geography 
of desire. In her analysis of utopias, Pieper (1996, 184) makes notice of the ‘classic 
state-utopias’. In her description, many classic state-utopias are situated on remote 
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islands, in geographical nowhere places (i.e. everywhere). Where, in their remoteness 
and isolation they are able to create a new legitimate ground of human coexistence 
with exemplary meaning.
Although presented as a policy, the idea of a wider Europe seems much more of an 
autobiographic sketch on how the European Union desires the future geographies of 
Europe to be. And because it is almost written like a utopia, the policy documents on its 
external relations and in particular the ENP represent what Pieper (1996, 194) observes, 
a utopia in the sense of an ‘experiment of practical reason’ which is an appropriate me-
dium of imagining a desirable future. The European Neighbourhood Policy sketches 
a mutual future of the EU and its neighbouring countries (including North Africa, 
the Middle East, Eurasia and Russia) in sharing a zone of stability, security and well 
being. This sketch focuses on three central objectives2: The EU foresees a prosperous 
European neighbourhood (‘promote prosperity in our neighbourhood by supporting 
our neighbours’ economic reform processes and offering significant economic integra-
tion’). Second, it foresees a free and democratic neighbourhood (‘to advance freedom 
and democracy in our neighbourhood by deepening political cooperation, on the basis 
of shared values and common interests’). The last sketch draws on a secure and stable 
Europe (‘to promote security and stability by working with neighbours to address de-
velopment, environment, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism issues’). 
 Pieper concludes by observing that ‘U-topia’ is consequently not only the place-
less nowhere, but also ‘Eu-topia’ (the good place/ the good human) that presents a 
perfect final state in which every development towards a higher cultural or political 
state has become unnecessary. Moreover, The Eu-topia is placed outside time and the 
transitions of empirical reality. In relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
the Greek Eu-topia of the good place reveals an odd similarity in which the Eu not 
only linguistically, but also in its meaning overlaps with EU-topia as the ideal of the 
good Europe. The ideal of good Europe is in this context especially signified by what 
the European Union has named ‘Europeanization’ (of the neighbourhood). The term 
Europeanization has been around for some time and is widely discussed in various 
debates on EU policy making (for example see Kostadinova 2009, Boedeltje and van 
Houtum, 2008 and forthcoming 2011). In its institutional meaning we have learned 
that Europeanization departs from a belief in the process of ongoing ‘Western’ civi-
lization set around distinct universal moral values (good governance, respect for hu-
man rights, the rule of law, democratisation, scientific progress etc.). The imagination 
of a ‘good Europe’ is nicely put forward by Luiza Bialasiewicz (2008, 74) who cites 
Mark Leonard’s idea of Europe’s ‘Invisible power’ as a ‘Transformative power’ that in 
the long run will cumulate in ‘a perfect world’. The transformative power of the EU 
is such that once ‘sucked into its sphere of influence, countries are changed forever’. 
This so-called  ‘power of attraction’ doesn’t mean transformation by the threat of 
military invasion, but the threat of being left out and excluded. 
The core argument of the EU’s ideals and its power of attraction is represented 
in the speeches of various EU policy makers (see for an extensive analysis Boedeltje 
and van Houtum, 2011). Especially the speeches of former Commissioner for External 
2  The three central objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are taken from the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Website. To be found http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm 
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Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner stand out.  For the EPP ‘PanEuropa” group in 
Strasbourg on December 14, 2005 her core argument presents the ENP as a ‘bridge-
building policy which applies Europe’s soft power, since Europe does not aim for 
regime change, but it rather does system change (or regime transformation). Soft 
power requires carrots as well as sticks and is contextualized through a range of 
policy instruments such as development aid, trade policy, civilian and military cri-
sis management, diplomacy and humanitarian assistance’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). 
What she has in mind is an ENP making a ‘united Europe a pole of stability and 
a beacon of prosperity using its ideas as weapons as they are the raw materials of 
politics’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2005). Although Ferrero-Waldner refers to soft power in 
the geopolitical framing of the ENP, the use of the word ‘weapons’ must be taken 
seriously as we shall see. Ferrero-Waldner calls this Europe’s strategic idealism. On 
the international conference at the Institute for Human Sciences on 20 January 2006 
in Vienna she mentioned the ENP as the ‘latest edition to our democratization tool-
box’ in which strategic idealism is brought by ‘encouraging the spirit of democracy’ 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006b). Or what she described in a consequent speech on ‘the EU 
in the world’ (Brussels, 2 February 2006) as follows: ‘In more geo-political terms our 
ENP is presented as a mix of carrots and sticks, mobilizing the neighbourhood states 
in support of our political objectives in order to benefit fully from the leverage we 
possess’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). In this speech she focused on Europe’s ideal role 
in the world aiming at becoming a strong and mentor and guide for its neighbours.
Between the lines of the consequent speech she delivered at the Swedish Institute 
for International affairs and the European Commission representation in Stockholm 
on march 7 2006 (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a), the Europeanization agenda is clearly vis-
ible. The speech continued with the summing up of what she expressed as some of 
the EU’s citizens most pressing concerns. These concerns are to some extent obvious 
and understandable that is to say they involve everyday concerns like security and 
stability, but what is most striking is that this speech tops energy supplies as the EU 
citizen’s top concern. This sudden overt expression of strategic economic interest 
certainly contradicts the generous offers of a mutual equal partnership agreed on 
common interests as described in the earlier documents and even continues to be 
emphasized in the current documents. The other concerns are formulated in equal 
geostrategic terms. To illustrate, migration is described as ‘welcoming those migrants 
we need for our economic and social well-being, while clamping down on illegal im-
migration’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a). 
Hence, not only is the commission’s perception towards the neighbourhood one 
of mistrust but also of a distancing moral superiority, which together, make the pillar 
on which the relationship with that same neighbourhood a rather shaky one. This 
makes the ENP from the start an asymmetric policy, emphasized by ‘the fact that its 
content and format had not been the ‘subject of a democratic dialogue’ (Darbouche, 
2008, 377). As the speech indicates common associations and old partnerships based 
on historical links and values are seen by the EU as important to urge the neigh-
bours to recognize European values and involves a complex range of bordering and 
ordering practices that urgently demand a cooperative attitude. But, as Kostadinova, 
(2009, 249) sharply observed, even if Europeanization not openly claims its univer-
sality ‘there is clearly the feeling that the EU’s way for doing things is better and 
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therefore necessary to ensure that the neighbouring countries will take it on board’. 
In effect, states that are reluctant to accept European values will either be excluded 
from the benefits of the ENP or adopted to repressive strategies as the example of 
Belarus indicates. Yet, the constant hammering on the recognition of common values 
apparently also implies the current perceived lack of these values among the neigh-
bours and has put an uneasy pressure on the relations between the EU and its new-
neighbours. Kostadinova (2009, 243) in this respect remarks the EU’s expectations to 
‘undertake fundamental and often painful reforms in the name of eradicating the 
existing dangers’ contradicts the absence of full European integration through mem-
bership. In so doing, the European Union creates a political discourse that is built on 
the interdependence of economic, political and social/cultural determinations and 
can be ‘located somewhere in the undefined space between the EU’s partnerships 
and full membership’ (Sasse (2008, 297). From the speeches we have also learned 
that a distinct way of carrot and stick policies with neighbouring partners is what 
has been typified as ‘shaming’, or ‘name-and-shame’ strategies. Although in her work 
on accession for CEPS Tocci (2008,3) mainly referred to candidate states, the same is 
certainly applicable to the EU’s neighbourhood policy when she mentioned that the 
‘commission progressively felt comfortable to criticise and shame the candidates’ 
shortcomings by publicly announcing policy recommendations’. Klitsounova (2008, 
12) explains shaming strategies as ‘creating an international and domestic climate of 
opinion critical of national human rights violations’ and other values. Another way of 
provoking regime transformation that is used is through the strategy of subjective be-
havioural changes (social learning). Here the Western neo-liberal agenda is supposed 
to be spread through civil-society via education, NGOs, cultural exchange, media, 
school, cultural assistance and perception (see for a more extensive description van 
Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011). 
A special and interesting point in this fusion of confusing geographies and invis-
ible power is the fact that the EU’s external borders are no longer solely to be found 
where one would expect them to be. The increasingly invisible European frontier 
strengthens, as Foucault observes, the illusion: we think we enter where we are, by 
the very fact that we enter, excluded. Invisible and flexible bordering is strongly re-
lated to social learning like the exchange programs, cultural diplomacy, education, 
signing contracts, gaining grants, Erasmus programs, flexible visa regulations etc. But 
it is also at these increasingly invisible frontiers where the system gives the illusion of 
being cooperative that we can find flexible exclusion for those entering (conditionality, 
carrot and stick policies). One of the EU’s ‘invisible’ strategies is to support civil soci-
ety across its borders within neighbouring states and empower them with European 
values, democratic politics and neo-liberal engagement but without the possibility 
of EU citizenship. The civil society partners that fully cooperate with incorporating 
European values are financially and politically rewarded with ‘further inclusion’ into 
the EU. Saying no to these European moral conditions can eventually only be the ‘un-
civil’ choice which will be answered by exclusion, indicating that conditionality and 
socialization processes are designed not primarily to strengthen the neighbouring 
states in their own struggles but to bring them into order and to play according to the 
rules and expectations of the dominant European order by teaching them to be better 
stakeholders (Butler and Ntseng, 2008). Instead of battling inequality and stimulating 
56
cross-cultural traffic, the Europeanization of civil society encourages dependencies 
and only accepts differences in accordance with the differences set by the European 
Union and not vice versa. Grass-root organisations and other stakeholders are only 
accepted as such if they accept the values set by dominant European standards. This 
leaves them little than to mediate and control what the EU delivers to them. True dif-
ference and alternatives to the standards set by the ENP are not accepted as they are 
counted as irrational, militant, and/or ideal. This leaves true alternative stakeholders 
often outside the official discourse of civil society. The construction of a European 
civil society therefore involves the loyalty to dominant values through a system of 
rewarding and financial privileges as set by the European Union and the consequent 
devaluation of local alternatives set by its neighbours. 
Source: ENP website
Figure 5: How the EU sees itself and its neighbours
4.3 UTOPIA VERSUS ANTI-UTOPIA
When taking a closer look at the proposed intentions, ENP ‘Europeanization’ of the 
neighbourhood seems indeed not to be desiring a revaluation and reversal of neo-
liberal values but are contrarily designed to keep revaluations that resist or dan-
ger these values at a distance. This entails that from the position of the EU-topia 
of good Europe, anti-utopia is seen as a threat, a serious disturbance of the final 
state of Europe, a revenge of time and empirical reality. The figure of the anti-uto-
pian is particularly embodied in the usage of the term ‘neighbour’ (in the European 
Neighbourhood policy). As I already remarked, the conventional meaning a neigh-
bour lives close by but belongs to a different family with different values and habits. 
And because of the differences and nearness, neighbours are kept at a psychologi-
cal distance. This more or less seems to indicate that the signification of neighbour 
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contains difference. Difference in the European context seems to be understood as 
the right of difference but only within the parameters of European values. That is 
to say, that difference is tolerated as long as the respect for the symbolic standard of 
humanity is respected. Therefore, the prevailing political discourses in the European 
Union as EU-topia has indicated that true difference has to be overcome through the 
sake of democracy, liberalism and equality and a particular desired relations between 
women and men. The overcoming or erasure of difference can be reached by employ-
ing different strategies (such as certain policies of conditionality and social learning 
as well as promotional campaigns). This overcoming of difference however, seems to 
entail a certain hegemonic vision of Europeanness, which not only applies to those 
who subscribe to this vision, but also to neighbouring states who might have a dif-
ferent perspective on their role in society. In this context, the notion of Europe within 
the dominant discourse seems rather one sided when taking into consideration that 
freedom and also tolerance has a rather limited European scope. 
In the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy the neighbour is instantly 
defined as the distant other (them behind the external EU border) which raises the 
immediate suggestion whether the neighbour is regarded a good neighbour with 
similar values or not. ENP documents seem to signify this difference by referring to 
the current anti-utiopian tendencies in the European neighbourhood countries, the 
lack of (economic) development, state-oppression, authoritarian rule, possible threats, 
economic backwardness, and societal chaos (all mentioned in the key documents of 
the ENP as well as the European Security strategy). 
Here suddenly ‘good Europe’ seems threatened by the potential presence of the 
anti-utopian. Indeed, one particular drawback of this example of the classic state-
utopia is that it is not situated in a remote nowhere place, but that we talk about a very 
central place close to empirical reality and the transitions of time. Here, the nearness 
of the real world seems a source of concern for the EU-topia. 
The modern anti-utopian future visions that are especially reflected in the work 
of George Orwell and Aldous Huxley take as Annemarie Pieper (1996, 184/185) re-
marks, the ‘basic human conflict as social-political principle’ and sketch a ‘satirical 
antitype’ of an outright manipulated people – ‘robbed from his humanity’ – who exist 
as cartoon of his classical counterpart. Where in EU-topia the ideal consist of a pros-
perous, stable, democratic Europe, the anti-utopian ideal is embodied by a threaten-
ing and chaotic state (like the Orwellian ideal of the eternal war). Charity and peace 
in EU-topia is countered by hatred, chaos and state oppression in the anti-utopian 
ideal. Pieper (1996, 185) sharply observes that the EU-topian principle of equality is 
replaced by inequality in Huxley’s Brave New World, where good Europe faces its 
horrific scenario in which people have become monsters developed to serve the state 
as well functioning animals. This fearsome future represented by the nightmare 
scenario of a Europe driven by chaos and hatred has not remained unnoticed in the 
contemporary European debate. Fabrizio Tassinari (2009) of EU research institute 
CEPS recently characterized the neighbourhood relations as Europe’s development of 
a ‘Siege mentality’ in which the European Union seems increasingly fearing its neigh-
bours and this is according to Tassinari, reflected in Europe’s identity crisis in which 
the European neighbourhood mirrors the EU’s ‘Institutional paralysis, ineffectual 
foreign policy, and morbid fear of migrants and multiculturalism’ (see also Boedeltje, 
58
2011, under review). This fear and anxiety involves a sense of neighbouring anonym-
ity without a clear known identity or characteristic; in many documents it is either 
considered a good or troubled neighbourhood. Bialasiewicz (2009, 83) has made a 
remark on this by stating that especially the southern neighbours have been typified 
by European elites as a ‘geopolitical space without any significant degree of political 
or ideational collective identity’. When taking a closer look at the policy documents, 
the use of neighbourhood never refers to complex realities, local processes, particular 
places, families, people or cities. The structuring of these documents relies on sta-
tistics, maps, intelligence and policy documents and consequently seems to create a 
bureaucratic codification out of complex realities. 
In this perspective, Bialasiewicz et al (2009, 83) recently mentioned the ‘grow-
ing belief among European political elites that a (European Neighbourhood) can be 
‘made’. This believe (or codification) in geo-political make-ability is emphasized by 
the homogeneous tendencies of supranational politics. EU barometers provide figures 
on children, economic backwardness, illnesses, unemployment, criminals, migrants 
etc. on which opinions rely. Neighbours are counted and placed in relation to EU 
standards. Political transformation, civil society and economic figures are monitored 
and evaluated in subsequent policies for further improvement. Statistics are inter-
preted in relation to each other on which budgets are based. In support of numbers, 
the promotion of Europeanization has been extensively advocated by speeches of 
EU commissioners and representatives in relation to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (for extensive analyses on EU speeches on the ENP see for example Boedeltje 
and van Houtum, 2011 and Kostadinova, 2009).  French philosopher Alain Badiou 
(2005 and 2006) refers in this perspective to a contemporary European ideology based 
on neo-liberalism and it has presented itself in two ways. The first is the appearance 
of an economic moral on which European politics is based. Humanitarian interven-
tions (for example conditionality politics towards EU neighbouring states) are justi-
fied in name of neo-liberal values. Second is the totality of this ideology, exemplified 
by the domination of the economy and the limited space for alternative ideas. And 
indeed the onset of the ENP following the 2004 enlargement, the growing belief of 
a makeable Europe has not remained at the table. Imaginaries of this ‘ideal version 
of Europe increasingly informs the EU’s “real” actions in the international arena’ 
(Bialasiewicz 2008, 77, 2009). She points to the examples of Frontex patrols in the 
Mediterranean and the UK’s initiatives for offshore and juxtaposed borders.
 In these examples, the fear and anxiety of losing its own competitive position 
could well be given in by the anti-utopian horror scenarios as described by Orwell 
and Huxley. The desired ideal of the EU in which it has sketched its own EU-topia, 
partly outside empirical reality and constructed by geopolitical imaginations that do 
hardly connect with empirical reality is as Klitsounova (2008, 12) sharply observed 
‘fundamentally been shaped by the belief that the EU can act as a normative “norm-
sender”, i.e. can succeed in inducing its neighbours to conform to its norms and rules 
and thus trigger policy changes in the new EU neighbourhood’. The urging need for 
distinction between the European Union (as norm setter) and its neighbours (to which 
norms have to be sent) has been emphasized in the various policy documents, but 
especially made clear in the European security policy where it claims that it is in the 
‘European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who 
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are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dys-
functional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems 
for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings 
the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed coun-
tries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with 
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’ (European security Policy, 2003). 
Seemingly this document uncovers not only the classic utopia in the sense of 
a being together as born Europeans in a good place with good values, but also an 
anti-utopian scenario of a chaotic and threatening neighbourhood. This has been 
outlined in the publication in Antipode (Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2009). In this 
publication we refer to Badiou (2005a) notion of the Law, by which he means the state 
of the situation, as a “prescription of reasonable order”. The difference between the 
subsets of neighbours and illegal migrants is the result of an obstinate ideology of 
“ethics” (Badiou 2005b:28, 29). According to Badiou, this ideology of the Law decides 
which parts are accepted as normality under the predicative order and which parts 
are forbidden—considered abnormal and un-lawful, illegal. Recently, Agamben has 
similarly explained the working of this inclusive exclusion in the normalization pro-
cess of the sovereign (Agamben 2002). Earlier, Schmitt made a comparison of the con-
struction of the exception, which, in his words, is a consequence of the processes of 
Ortung (claiming a location) und Ordnung (bordering and ordering) (Schmitt 1950). 
The political classification has nothing to do with any political truth based on justice 
( = equality). Equality can only exist if all subsets, all possible constructible subsets, 
are equal under the law. Under the predicative order of the European Union the ethi-
cal difference between these two subsets is the a priori recognition and consensual 
identification of evil vis- a-vis the good.  
In a similar vein, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has, in a commanding way, argued 
that the construction of fear has to be explicated from a feeling of being deluged 
by unnamable, potentially immense hordes, masses and streams of “others” who 
threaten to negate the existing and familiar world, or worse, to make it disappear 
(see Harari 2001; Lacan 2004; Zizek 1997). This influx of “others” is considered over-
whelming when there is an apparent shortage of space for identity construction. The 
influx of the unnameable is considered and imagined to be dangerous for the fulfil-
ment of being “European” in terms of authority, citizenship and identity, and for the 
economic well-being and public safety (protection) of Europeans. Moral panic incited 
by the media is the general factor for the imagined lack of space which makes people 
feel uncomfortable and the familiar alienated. The erection of a border is an often 
used strategy when the sequential “threat” of the unnameable increases. Installing a 
border is basically saying, keep your distance (van Houtum, Boedeltje, 2009, 235/236). 
The interesting and relevant viewpoint in the construction of EU-topia is the link 
between certain symbolic European particularities (for example market-economy as 
liberation model for third world countries, but also a certain order in the relationship 
between good Europe’ and second and third world nations) that have been translated 
into political actions. From this perspective European policy makers use the politi-
cized idea of Europe as a zone in which particular norms are applied. Norms which 
not only count as imagination but also norms that set a certain standard of what is 
considered right and wrong in the relation between individuals. Lewis mentions 
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this link between a certain imaginative Europeanness and the political actions in 
quite similar terms: ‘It is a symbolism that positions Europe and the European as the 
standard of humanity and closes down questions as to whose identity, autonomy, 
family and privacy are to be respected, at whose cost and with what consequences 
for Europe’s potential for an economy of equality’ (Lewis, 2006, 92, 93).
Annemarie Pieper has in an earlier stage remarked that we need utopias for our 
orientation and guidance in constructing a desired and preliminary image of the 
future. But they need to be realistic. Their abundance of idealism should not lead to 
delusion and a distance to reality. The danger of confusing an ideal EU-topia with 
political action is an all too dangerous one, as history has taught us. Unfortunately, 
in the vast stream of EU documents on external relations the question of European 
and non – or at least less — European is increasingly discussed and even politicized. 
61
5 Heterogeneous Europe: 
Heterotopias 
5.1 SPACES OF RESISTANCE
What seems lost in the ENP visions of a single neighbourhood where political and 
cultural reality is levelled to an abstract picture of the neighbourhood as an object 
of Europeanization, is the sense of everyday life, a sense of local realities, a sense of 
geography, not defined through its desired image, but in the sense of actual places, 
real faces and villages. What I mean with that is that the EU constructs its neighbour-
hood more like a film, as Foucault remarked in relation to the heterotopias: bringing, 
onto stage ‘One after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another; 
thus it is that the cinema is a very odd rectangular room, at the end of which, on a 
two-dimensional screen, one sees the projection of a three-dimensional space’. In a 
similar perspective, Etienne Balibar (2004, 16) relates the difficulty of translating the 
complex realities of a three-dimensional space into a simplified two-dimensional 
screen to ‘the impossibility we struggle against, the impossibility of inventing a new 
image of a European people because this invention has been reproduced throughout 
history’. The invention of an objective bounded entity was resilient through the co-
lonial era into the era of Cold war and post-cold war Europe, and already dramatic 
in nationalities, they are again replicated in today’s European Union. This so called 
will-to-power of Europe, is in reality a demonstration of its incapacity to regulate 
differences and conflicts within its own limits’. 
The later work of Gerard O’Tuathail stands out as one of the first early examples 
of critical geopolitics with distinct interest in actual places, real faces and villages. 
His earlier contributions on Northern Ireland and the Americas reflect situations in 
which complicated lives are often overlooked by simplified normative policies (see 
O’Tuathail, 2010). Since, critical geopolitics has taken its responsibility by criticizing 
the descent of geopolitical complexity. Throughout his work since 1996 O’Tuathail 
expresses the need for a more heterogeneous perspective on geopolitics. In his recent 
contribution in Political Geography O’Tuathail (2010, 2 and 3) proposes a ‘ground-
level critical geopolitics: a more geographical geopolitics that disaggregates rather 
than homogenizes actors, and, by implication, localizes rather than globalizes analy-
sis and explanation’. Here he emphasizes the ‘disjuncture and contradictions in the 
relationship between the grounded local and the foreign policy discourse and prac-
tices of the major powers’. Moreover, he remarks that ‘a grounded critical geopolitics 
could also focus on how localized conditions, structures and power struggles medi-
ate and subvert international interventionist practices’. O’Tuathail’s call for a more 
geographical transformative geopolitics reflects his earlier call for a different way of 
seeing geopolitics. In one of his extensive studies on Bosnia he calls for ‘elaborating 
the provisional category of an anti-geopolitical eye, a disturbing way of seeing that 
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disrupts the framework of the hegemonic geopolitical eye that structures the seeing 
in contemporary (dominant) foreign policy discourse’ (O’Tuathail, 1996, 173).
The anti-geopolitical eye is to some extent reflected in heterotopias. Heterotopias 
are the central concept of a more grounded geopolitics in my dissertation. Heterotopias 
as a concept has been introduced by Michel Foucault and reflect disturbing places 
that confront utopias with their impossibilities. Michel Foucault had the ability to 
think differently on the meaning of space, which for me became a way of seeing 
Europe differently. His visions cannot be classified as a-political, however, without 
giving explicit geographical locations or representing a clear geo-political vision (in 
fact they often referred to anonymous spaces to escape the political burdens of map-
ping). Foucault was able to sketch a geography that is social, inclusive and far away 
from geopolitical power practices, nationalism, flags and distinct borders. His world 
very much represents a space that is open to everyone and excludes no one out of 
distinct claims of territorial belonging.
Some time ago I came across a small article written in 1967 but was only published 
after his death in 1984. This little piece became essential in my theoretical search 
for geographies of resistance and has a prominent place in my article on Foucault’s 
work: ‘The Other Spaces of Europe, Reflections on the geo-political imaginations in 
the European Neighbourhood.’ (forthcoming 2011 in geopolitics). Although it relates 
to the symbolic notion of ‘place’ it had long been left aside by geographers until it 
was eventually picked up by critical scholars like David Harvey, Henri Levebvre 
and Ed Soja, who referred to it in explaining power practices in urban spaces. Titled 
of Other spaces (heterotopias) Foucault used the idea of a mirror as a metaphor for 
the duality and contradictions, the reality and the unreality of utopian projects. A 
mirror is metaphor for utopia because the image that is seen does not exist, but it is 
also a heterotopia because the mirror is a real object that shapes the way you relate 
to your own image. Foucault calls for a society with many heterotopias, not only be-
cause these places affirm difference through its multiple interpretations, but also as 
a means of escape from authoritarianism and repression. Stated metaphorically the 
ship is the utmost heterotopia, claiming that a society without ships is inherently a 
repressive one. Foucault believed that politics did not serve what he himself thought 
were its intended anti-authoritarian principles.
In the discipline of geography most notably David Harvey and Ed Soja have in-
troduced the concept to the discipline. Ed Soja introduced Foucault’s heterotopias to 
encounter a post-modern explanation of the city in the early 1990s. Soja uses the work 
of Foucault to refer to the heterotopic space that ‘draws us out of ourselves, in which 
we assist in the erosion of our lives, our time and our history, the space that claws 
and gnaws at us’ (Soja, 1995, 15). In this postmodern explanation, social power and its 
relation to space is explained as a shifting movement between ‘the power of the place’ 
and ‘the place of power’. According to Bonazzi (2002, 44) Soja used the ‘problematic 
geography of Foucault to show that the confusing multiplicity of appearances does 
not merely signify anarchic dispersion with no order and function but, according to 
the concept of heterotopia that Soja put forward, it is precisely this form of disper-
sion that constitutes the social order; in other words, he linked the totality of the 
representations contained in the space in question’. According to this explanation 
Soja seems to introduce heterotopias as a new direction for geographers by helping 
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them to generate new ideas and new visions to rediscover the city by looking with 
the critical eye for spaces that contest, reshape and refresh the existing modern vision 
of the city. Soja used the example of downtown Los Angeles to emphasize the post 
modern spaces that reveal the ideologies, the hidden knots, and the entanglements 
(Bonazzi 2002, 44).
For David Harvey, Foucault’s work on heterotopias provides an opening to contest 
the dominant institutionalized discourses of spatializations. According to Harvey, 
heterotopias ‘allows us to think of the multiple utopian schemes that have come down 
to us through history as not mutually exclusive (feminist, anarchist, ecological and 
socialist utopian spaces can all coexist). It encourages the idea of what Marin (1984) 
calls "spatial plays" to highlight choice, diversity, difference, incongruity and incom-
mensurability. It enables us to look upon the multiple forms of transgressive behav-
iors (usually normalized as "deviant") in urban spaces as important and productive’ 
(Harvey, 2000 no pages). Harvey regards heterotopias as spaces of difference, spaces 
of otherness. ‘The cemetery and the concentration camp, the factory and the shop-
ping malls, the Disneylands, Jonestown, the militia camps, the open plan office, New 
Harmony, gated communities are all sites of alternative ways of doing things and 
therefore in some sense heterotopic. What appears at first sight as so open by virtue 
of its multiplicity suddenly appears as banal: an eclectic mess of heterogeneous and 
different spaces within which anything "different" – however defined – might go on’ 
(Harvey, 2000). Harvey relates the Foucauldian idea of heterotopias to the premise of 
escape. If the Disneylands are a form of escape from normality, where is the critical, 
liberatory and emancipatory point, Harvey asks? He criticizes Foucault for presenting 
a more or less ‘banal’ concept void of substantial clarification of his spatial metaphor. 
By refusing again and again to elaborate on the material grounding for his incredible 
arsenal of spatial metaphors, he evades the issue of a geographical knowledge proper 
to his understandings (even in the face of his use of actual spatial forms such as pano-
pticans and prisons to illustrate his themes) and fails to give tangible meaning to the 
way space is "fundamental to the exercise of power" (Harvey, 2000).
Harvey was criticized by fellow geographers Castree and Gregory (2006) of solely 
focusing on the spatial aspect of Foucault’s work and not taking into consideration his 
broader visions of society (e.g. biopolitics). ‘If Foucault only interests Harvey for what 
he has to say about space (which seems a needlessly flattened reading, what about 
biopolitics?) how is it possible to say so little about Birth of the clinic and Discipline 
and Punish? And how can Harvey constantly reduce material that recurs in so many 
of Foucault’s studies to mere metaphors (Castree and Gregrory, 2006, 21)?
However, despite this criticism Harvey and also Soja remain sources of inspi-
ration for enriching the discipline of geography with thoughtful philosophical in-
sights. In a recent publication, feminist geographer Gail Lewis has nicely described 
the Foucauldian metaphor of the ship in relation to immigrants. In her research on 
the role of the immigrant women in Europe the Foucauldian ship acts as a ‘container 
category for all that is not Europe/European even while this figure is the symbolic 
site upon which Europe makes claim to its status as the cradle of humanity and 
civilization’ (Lewis, 2006, 89). The role of the immigrant women as metaphor for 
anti-geopolitics in European societies has been of importance in feminist geography. 
As Jennifer Fluri (2009a, 251) remarks, bodies are often ‘key sites for representing 
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and monitoring modernity and resistance to modernity. The body acts as the site for 
the imprinting of social constructions of gender, race, sex and sexuality as well as 
the countering of these social norms’ something Foucault dedicated his entire oeu-
vre to. This is, according to the work of Lewis, also reflected in the political idea of 
Europe. This idea of a Europe with specific symbolic qualities (minority rights, good 
governance, respect for human rights and neo-liberalism) is transcended above the 
particularities of individual nation-states and cultural nationalities. 
Foucault reflects in this little work on this transcendence of particularities.  He 
saw that this geopolitical ‘obsession’ (he called it obsession) with specific norms of the 
present day clearly contradicts with the ‘obsession’ of the nineteenth century, which 
according to Foucault was obsessed with history. The obsession of the present day is 
the ‘Epoch of space’. He takes this present ‘obsession’ with space as starting point for 
his analysis on distinct places. 
Foucault starts his essay with an analysis on the structure of space, which he 
thought was linked to the historical understanding of space. The structuring of space 
involves a historical process of causes and consequences ordered by time. In this par-
ticular context, space is considered a historical process of structuring the human hori-
zon. By taking this angle, Foucault deliberately refuses to give space a neutral value. 
Instead he considers it as a social construct prone to power practices and reflected 
in the example of Galileo who linked time to historical being, placing mankind in 
the centre of his own universe. Galileo replaced the ‘space of emplacement’ which 
Foucault called medieval space. Medieval spaces are timeless hierarchical spaces ex-
clusively defined by meaning (also to be referred to as communal spaces). Foucault 
defines sacred places, profane places, urban places, rural places and celestial places 
as opposed to the super celestial places. Foucault heavily criticized the consequences 
of Galileo’s objective constitution of an infinite open space in which a ‘things place 
was no longer anything but a point in its movement’. The timeless medieval space 
was dissolved by science and according to Foucault; ‘extension was substituted for lo-
calization for connections and networks but also for demography’. As a consequence 
Foucault considers space as the form of relations among sites, in which imagination 
of space is the form of our imaginations, not neutral or free.  
From this explanation Foucault elaborates on the utopian and heterotopian spaces. 
The homogenous space represents the relational world (in which we live in, interact 
and communicate), the space in which time and history occur is what Foucault iden-
tifies as ‘heterogeneous space’. This latter space is always subjected to power that 
redefines and renegotiates this space. Foucault takes the connection between the 
homogenous space and infinite space as defined by Galileo, to consider a ‘common 
locus’ beneath them. He does that twofold by defining utopias and heterotopias. 
‘utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is nevertheless a 
fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with 
vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the 
road to them is chimerical’ (Foucault, 1967, xviii). They are no real places and rep-
resent society’s ideal projected imaginations in a perfect form. Heterotopias on the 
other hand, are a complex phenomenon. They respond to the heterogeneous character 
of external space and the connection of elements of utopia to real places. That is to say 
they represent places ‘in which elements of existence otherwise unconnected to each 
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other connect’ (Dumm, 2002, 39). Heterotopias are what Foucault characterizes as 
counter-sites that simultaneously represent, contest and invert all other places within 
society by acting as a mirror to society. This mirror reveals the relation between the 
external relational world, the celestial space and the infinite open space. According 
to Foucault (1967, xviii) ‘Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly 
undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because 
they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy “syntax” in advance, and 
not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent 
syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to hold 
together’ (see also Boedeltje, 2011 forthcoming). 
Heterotopias are contradictory and disturbing spaces and for that reason conflict-
ing to utopias as they represent not an ideal utopian picture but the ambiguity of the 
situation in a way that they contest the homogenous space (Johnson, 2006). Foucault 
(2006) articulates several types of heterotypic spaces within his article:
1. A ‘crisis heterotopia’ is a separate space that has been designed to host those 
who are, in relation to society, in a state of crisis. These situations generally 
take place out of sight of society.  For example the military service for young 
men takes place outside home and manifest a certain stage of coming to age. 
According to Foucault, these places have almost disappeared.  
2. ‘Heterotopias of deviation’ are places where individuals are held whose behav-
iour is outside the norm of society (mental institutions, prisons, refugee camps). 
3. Heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, sev-
eral sites that are in themselves incompatible. A cinema is a heterotopia because 
it is a real place where on a two-dimensional screen the three-dimensional 
world is projected 
4. 'Heterotopias of time' such as museums and festivals enclose in one place ob-
jects from all times and modes.  
5. 'Heterotopias of ritual or purification' always presuppose a system of opening 
and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable. To get in one 
must have permission or apply to certain protocols. 
6. 'Heterotopias have a function in relation to all of the remaining spaces. The 
two functions are: heterotopia of illusion creates a space of illusion that exposes 
every real space, and the heterotopia of compensation is to create a real space—a 
space that is other. Foucault refers to the former colonies as spaces of compensa-
tion.
The various heterotopias are capable of gaining different perceptions over time. As 
history unfolds, Foucault observes, society can make an existing heterotopia func-
tion in a different way. The shifting function of heterotopias occurs according to the 
synchrony of the culture. On the first sight heterotopias seem to be operating on a 
different spatial scale than to be found in the European neighbourhood (another ex-
ample of heterotopias on a different spatial scale is the use of the term thirdspace by 
Soja in his analysis on imagined and real places in city spaces), however, in a second 
thought the geopolitical imaginations of the European Union indeed seem to repre-
sent a contradictory space where utopian imagination and real places come together 
in various disturbing realities. It is at the borderline between desired imaginations, 
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which I earlier called ‘EU-topia’ and the political realities in Europe where the ‘Other 
places of Europe’ manifest themselves as heterotopic places of resistance that resist 
and confront these ideal imaginations with their disturbing contradictions (see also 
Boedeltje, 2011 forthcoming).
Foucault’s heterotopias have no explicit geographical locations (in fact he referred 
often to nowhere spaces to escape any distinct mapping). In the following sections I 
will describe two distinct heterotopias that reflect Foucault’s ideas in Europe not by 
simply reflecting on its possible meanings but by translating the principles of resist-
ance to the level of real places in the EU and in its neighbourhood. In their variety, 
they represent places that disturb the European dream of a makeable neighbourhood. 
They are the ‘Other’ spaces of Europe that not only represent one single place, but 
also incorporate complex processes in which difference or alternative spaces unfold. 
Through the critical scrutiny of European heterotopias of Belarus and Cyprus, I seek 
to outline that distinct local realties disturb and resist the hegemonic visions of policy 
makers. Simplified policy models collapse in the contradictory and confusing geogra-
phies of Europe’s borderlands. Belarus reflects the tension between on the one hand 
EU-topia as ideal and on the other the invisibility of Belarus on the European map. 
This tension between imagination and invisibility embodies the question where the 
ideal version of Europe begins, and where it ends. Cyprus reflects the tension be-
tween two divergent versions of Europeanness. How bearable is it for a community 
to have a different view and to be part of a community that is separated between the 
ideal image given in by the European Union and the complex local historical context. 
5.2 BELARUS
The choice for Belarus as heterotopia is given in by extensive analysis on speeches 
and documents as represented on the EU website and the ENP website. What inter-
ested me in the analyses of the documents was the particular neo-liberal perspective 
throughout the documents. This was also reflected in the documents on Belarus not 
only by the EU/ENP but also by EU think tanks such as CEPS. Belarus is a peculiar 
case in the European Neighbourhood. The first major point of interest is that Belarus 
as a country is virtually absent in EU critical geopolitics. Belarus seems not to relate 
to the EU and hardly admissible. Its political non-existence is peculiar as Belarus is in 
the centre of the European Neighbourhood and only an overnight train journey from 
Berlin. Apart from North Korea, which uses its ‘threatening’ invisibility to reinforce 
its geopolitical position, it is unusual in an era of spectacle and globalization to find 
a state which is virtually invisible and absent from visual imaginations. The increas-
ing desire of a certain understanding of Europe (i.e. the world) contradicts with the 
realities in Belarus. Therefore, the main achievement of the authoritarian regime of 
Lukashenko might well be his persistent invisibility, how bleak this may seem. 
 Bialasiewitcz et al. (2008, 77) have earlier mentioned the tendency that geopoliti-
cal imaginations increasingly inform the EU’s actions. However, Belarus is exactly the 
embodiment of the impossibility to grasp Europe in a single picture. To put it stronger, 
there exists no picture of Belarus. No visual image of its Europeanness or its identity, 
but more like a black hole. On several occasions, the EU made Belarus the offer of 
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participating in its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which the ‘EU wishes to 
share with its neighbours the prosperity, stability and security which its own citizens 
enjoy. This requires political, economic and administrative reforms from our partner 
countries’ (ENP website). However, Lukashenko’s regime and the EU’s offer to Belarus 
of joining the ENP is comparable to a cat offering cheese to a mouse (like the famous 
rivalry between Tom and Jerry in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer cartoon). With accepting 
that offer, Lukashenko would certainly dig his own political grave, something which 
the EU emphasized: ‘Unfortunately, at this stage, the policies pursued by President 
Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime prevent us from offering Belarus full participation 
in our neighbourhood policy. The EU cannot offer to deepen its relations with a regime, 
which denies its citizens their fundamental democratic rights. The people of Belarus 
are the first victims of the isolation imposed by its authorities and will be the first to 
reap the benefits on offer to a democratic Belarus’ (ibid). Belarus excluded itself from 
the EU’s agenda. Left aside, isolated to the extent that there is hardly information. From 
both sides the invisibility was further fuelled by a series of measures that wiped out 
political interaction: ignorance, shaming strategies, travel and trade restrictions (includ-
ing restricting Lukashenko to travel to EU countries) and a freeze of assets. Through 
these actions, the geographical presence of Belarus was further put under pressure in 
the imagined geopolitical picture of the EU.
Does this make Belarus the embodiment of resistance to the geographies of desire 
and the EU-topia? What it does seems to make clear is that the European geogra-
phies of desire (EU-topia) takes the local sensitivities too much for granted. One of 
today’s most frequently used sources in EU geopolitics are the publications by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). Although independent as an EU think-
tank, CEPS is closely related to the European Union and represents on many occa-
sions the dominant liberal discourse. Its 2008 publication on Belarus (titled: The EU's 
Limited Response to Belarus' Pseudo 'New Foreign Policy') exemplifies this perspec-
tive with a strong favour for ‘European Values’. The paper attempts to analyse the 
dynamics of EU-Belarus relations and ‘Whether the EU has succeeded in increasing 
its leverage over the country’. Furthermore ‘it speculates on how the EU can engage 
with the people of Belarus more effectively’ and puts forward ‘A series of short-term 
and longer-term measures that the EU might consider, on the condition that Belarus 
commits to addressing the most basic requirements in the field of human rights and 
democratisation’. Certainly, the policy brief makes no notice of a cultural elite that is 
‘Split between the Westernisers and the people with pro-Moscow orientation’. It also 
makes no notice that this split transcends politics, and reflects ‘The heart of hearts of 
what it means to be a Belarusian’ to the point that ‘Belarusians suffer from a collective 
split identity. That their identity is Janus-faced, and so is Belarusian nationalism’ (this 
all is pointed out in the extensive research by Grigorry Ioffe, 2003, 1266/1267)). As a 
consequence EU geopolitics can find itself unintentionally in the service of the pre-
vailing hegemonic visions owing to their total reliance on geographical information 
provided by those biased visions and strategic (political) interests, to wit, the CEPS. 
Moreover, there is a significant danger that EU critical geopolitics becomes one-sided 
focused on Western European perspectives. 
 This danger of reduction of everyday life in which complicated realities are 
squeezed into a simple geopolitical map has become problematic, as we have seen in 
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the course of this dissertation. And ‘Because heterotopias are disturbing, Foucault 
(1967, xviii) remarks, ‘This is exactly why utopias permit fables and discourse: they 
run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of 
the fabula; heterotopias desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contests the very 
possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism 
of our sentences’. 
Seen from this perspective, the revenge of Geographies of resistance might well 
relate to Gerard O’Tuathail’s (1996, 173) ‘provisional category of an anti-political eye, 
a disturbing way of seeing that disrupts the framework of the hegemonic geopolitical 
eye that structures the seeing of places (…) in contemporary foreign policy discourse’. 
What comes to my mind are the words of the Moscow based American travel writer 
Jeffrey Tayler (2001, 342): ‘Belarusian friends of mine have praised Lukashenko and 
described a quiet life at home, free of the market chaos and anarchy of Russia, words 
that do not jibe with press reports that demonize the president and blame him for 
curtailing of civil liberties that recalls the Soviet days. I have come to Belarus to travel 
the land and find out what is going on’. Although travel writing is a particular genre 
with its own features and conventions, for Tayler, travelling is indeed geography 
and the gradual changes in landscape, climate, smell and people are all perceived in 
detail (in their changes and differences). In fact, detail matters in travelling. ‘We toast 
to our new friendship and dig in. I remark that the daughters are watching Russian, 
not Belarusian, television. ‘Yes you see, it was really tough in the beginning, after 
1991. Shushkevich changed the school language to Belarusian, and out daughters 
began doing badly. But then Lukashenko came and switched the language back. 
How could we expected to change languages, and why? We’re Belarusian, but our 
language is Russian. We watch the news from Russia. Everything here comes from 
Russia’ (348-349).   
For travellers like Tayler but also Paul Theroux who remarked that ‘luxury is the 
enemy of observation, a costly indulgence that induces such good feeling that you 
notice nothing’, the everyday experiences of geography are represented by a simple 
observing question to the local driver. ‘I ask Dmitry if the Kurapaty memorial means 
anything to him. He shrugs. We Belarusians are used to being occupied by one people 
or another. We’re tolerant people – we’ve had to learn tolerance – and we wouldn’t 
have done such a thing ourselves. Our tolerance has been our undoing, in fact. But I 
don’t have time to think about it. I have a wife and a daughter to feed.” (347).   
The stories of these ordinary people provide a different geopolitical picture that 
is not reflected in the dominant discourses.
5.3 CYPRUS
The need for transformative alternatives is particularly urgent in a time when Europe 
and the EU are increasingly connected, interchanged and even confused. This counts 
even more in the situation where European politicians are increasingly convinced by 
new maps that present an ideal representation of Europe and its neighbours. After 
I personally experienced the consequences of this confusion during fieldwork on 
Cyprus I argue that the duality between Europe as scripted by the homogeneous 
69
political imaginations of EU policy makers and the local and complex realities and 
everyday lives on Cyprus has resulted in a geopolitical discontent that is increasingly 
problematic.
One other particular aspect of heterotopias that Foucault defines is that hetero-
topias occur in relation to other spaces. According to Foucault, this function opens 
out in two extremes. The first is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real 
space. The second is the space of compensation that compensates for the lacks and ills 
of current society. Foucault wonders if the European colonies have not functioned in 
the role of heterotopias. In the European Neighbourhood Cyprus undoubtedly repre-
sents the tragic role of a heterotopia of compensation. During extensive fieldwork on 
Cyprus in 2004 and 2005 for the FP5 project ‘Exlinea’ I was able to witness the rigid 
complexities of local historical contexts in relation to EU policies.   
In order to understand this particular Foucauldian heterotopia Emerson eds. 
(2005, 217) noted in relation to the Neighbourhood Policy that the ‘syndrome of 
post-colonial sensitivities translating into reluctance to impose political conditional-
ity towards the neighbours seems to be fading away’. Earlier I have stated that the 
European Neighbourhood Policy is a two-dimensional space of illusion (a European 
Dream of a ring of stable partners). Foucault uses the example of certain colonies in 
the Americas of the seventeenth century. These settlements represented the perfect 
condition of human life in which daily life was regulated by the ringing of church 
bells. Everyone woke up at the same time and even the meal times were set. The vil-
lage was constructed around two axes with the church on the foot of the central axes. 
These two axes reproduced the sign of Christ and consequently ‘Christianity marked 
the space of the American world with its fundamental sign’. Europe’s colonial history 
has for a long time been a true syndrome as Emerson noted. Europe’s colonial rule 
in combination with the cleaning out of resources, products and people has left deep 
traces mostly in the former colonies. The Algerian Frenchman Franz Fanon (1961) 
observed that ‘colonialism is not satisfied merely holding a people in its grip and 
emptying their brain of all form and content. It turns to the past of the oppressed 
people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it’. Society turned towards the past and 
away from the actual events and all they embraced are in fact the cast-off of thought, 
its shells and corpses. In the colonial tragedy Fanon (1961) continues, ‘the colonised 
man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones 
against his own people’. 
The analogy with the current neo-colonial references to the European 
Neighbourhood has been widely debated among scholars (see for example the work of 
James Anderson, 2006). Like historical colonial practices, the current Europeanization 
of the neighbourhood could to a certain extent be explained as an act of compensation 
through the reproduction of European values and the structuring of geography, in 
which each neighbour carries out its duty.  
One particular example connected to the colonial heterotopias is Cyprus. Cyprus 
entered the EU as a divided island in 2004 after the UN Annan Peace plan and refer-
enda on unification between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots failed in a last 
attempt. For its part, the United Nations, because it embodies an unresolved tension 
between principles of human security and state-centric notions of sovereignty, failed 
to offer an adequate normative framework recognizing both sides in the conflict, while 
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variously complementing and undermining the goals of EU integration. Since, the 
Greek Cypriot government is acknowledged as sole representative of Cyprus in the 
EU. Up to today the political situation in Cyprus is unclear and fuzzy. The EU-acquis 
in all its complexity is not officially applicable to North-Cyprus. Despite ‘Special rules’ 
regarding facilitating flows of goods and persons to bring the Turkish Cypriot society 
closer to the European Union, everyday practices at the border indicate that this is 
frustrated by the Greek-Cypriot authorities. Current Greek-Cypriot resistance makes it 
impossible for the northern part to make use of EU funds and assistance, direct flights 
or trade and participate actively in EU programs. Cyprus as such represents the EU’s 
impossibility to grasp Europe in a single picture. To put it stronger, on official maps of 
Cyprus, there exists no visual image of the Turkish Cypriot society apart from its status 
as ‘Area inaccessible because of Turkish occupation’.
This ambiguity has also been recognized by sources close to the EU. The Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) recently remarked that ‘the obstacles to imple-
mentation, both legal and political, have proved formidable, exemplifying the difficul-
ties the EU has in acting decisively on Cyprus now that one party to the conflict is a 
member state. Having established its right to veto, the Greek Cypriot government has 
blocked all initiatives to approve and implement the regulation, insisting on its sole 
right to certify and verify origin of Cypriot exports, objecting to the use of Turkish 
Cypriot ports, and arguing that the regulation would lead to a creeping recognition 
of the ‘illegal’ Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’. As a consequence, the EU pro-
duces an institutional incapacity to treat Cyprus along a course that would diverge 
from that of traditional geopolitics, serving in the end to alienate the Turkish-Cypriot 
community in such a way as to doom any a priori political settlement. Specifically, 
European Union intervention on the issue of Cyprus relied to a great extent on a ‘car-
rot and stick’ policy whose governmentalizing logic attempted at first to determine 
the physical and statutory division of the island according to traditional geopolitical 
principles on which its earliest member states were founded (see Boedeltje et al. 2007). 
With the Cyprus issue EU geopolitics finds itself with an implicit conflict of inter-
est by granting one part of society to be European policymakers while simultaneously 
claiming to provide valid measures to bring the other half of society closer to European 
integration. When facing the rubble of the buffer zone that divides Nicosia today the 
need for an alternative geographical European geopolitics becomes all too clear.
The situation in Cyprus reflects a rather different ‘Europe’ than what has been 
designed as EU-topia in Brussels. The European promise might have worked well 
with the candidate states, however, it became clear that it did not work for Cyprus. 
For, the Turkish Cypriot neighbour, who has not become and cannot become fully 
European, will always be subjected to shifting policies of which they have no demo-
cratic influence, hard border management and other excluding reminders that it is 
not part of the EU. The willingness of the people to be part of this buffer zone and 
container politics of the European Union is therefore not self-evident 
In this context the call for geographical geopolitical alternatives seems genuine, 
however the real question remains how a more geographical geopolitics can do justice 
to a politics of peace and dialogue in Cyprus. I repeat Jennifer Hyndman strong re-
marks on how difficult it is to speak outside normative discourse, however when taking 
into account that political decision-making can only count when representing the lives 
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of ordinary people, I would argue that a transformative geopolitics should always start 
from the complicated lives of people who want to see an end to the tragedy what is go-
ing on in Cyprus. I believe together with Jennifer Hyndman that shared commonalities 
as love, loss and suffering can resist the dividing normative political discourse.  
When searching for an appropriate way to voice our fieldwork experiences, I (to-
gether with my colleagues), felt the dissatisfying gap between writing distant policy 
recommendations for the EU project and the things we saw along no-man’s-land in 
Nicosia. We all agreed that the appropriate way to voice the situation in Cyprus was 
to bring together the lives of people who we met during our fieldwork in a seminar 
that we organised in the middle of the geopolitical heart of Cyprus. Here musicians 
from north and south who joined together in the Olive tree project, children from 
bi-communal schools, common NGO’s working on environmental projects, academic 
visions, architects and politicians shared their common ground for a peaceful future. 
That very seminar represented an alternative representational space that gave voice 
to a transformative geopolitics not only because it created a grounded geopolitical 
osmosis that incorporated various voices but also because of its location in the UN 
controlled buffer-zone right in the middle of Nicosia.  
The meeting resulted in various publications that reflected the feeling of the semi-
nar. Through a personal and involved style, away from judgements or moralizing, 
we tried to write our contributions in such a way that they very much challenge con-
ventional political representations by seeing people beyond their constituted politi-
cal image of politically wrong, illegal or even criminal (see Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 
2007a). Although this style of writing might be prone to criticism for not being suffi-
ciently empirical or methodological or even prophetic or activist, I argue that it is not 
so much pure objectivity that matters when taking into consideration that only one 
part of society is represented in Europe. Euan Ferguson remarks in the Observer that 
truthfulness is ‘Embodied in listening, re-evaluating one’s own prejudices, trusting 
his subjects and winning trust back’. That truthfulness matter on a local geopolitical 
level has become clear on Cyprus. Despite the current partitioning people interact 
across the line to work, shop, go to school, sport and meet. Here at street level in the 
city of Nicosia the changes in cityscapes, smell, noise and products are perceived in 
their diversity (Boedeltje, forthcoming, 2010). 
Through the grey zone of the acquis communautaire, north Nicosia profits from 
European modernisation and the common market. Although the northern part of 
the island is still often labelled as ‘occupied territory’, this grey, self-created option 
means that the EU has indeed had a significant effect on the ‘Cyprus issue’. For 
the Greek Cypriot authorities, their hoped-for advantage of a stronger negotiation 
position in Europe did not turn out as expected. For the north, their fragile socio-
economic structures appear to have benefited from the common market with the 
Republic of Cyprus (see Boedeltje et al. 2007 and 2007a). This complex reality that 
unites rather than divides reveals the city's potential resistance to traditional geopo-
litical discourse. Cyprus heterotopic position might prevent the EU from politicising 
its dreams. Indeed, the neighbourhood is not a utopian site presenting society in a 
perfected form. Foucault has stretched that utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces. 
In that sense is the neighbourhood a space of compensation; an unreal space of what 
wider Europe and certainly Cyprus would never be.  
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The particular examples of Belarus and Cyprus reflect a disturbing way of see-
ing. What these examples indicate is that these European regions are transit 
places, literally in between isolation and penetration, between being welcome 
or being unwelcome. The contradictions between illusionary and real prac-
tices, between inclusion and exclusion marks as Zizek (2006, 21) ‘a frontier 
between those who succeeded in remaining ‘within’ (the ‘developed’, those to 
whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., still apply) and the others, 
the excluded (the main concern of the ‘developed’ with regard to them is how 
to contain their explosive potential), even if the price to be paid is the neglect 
of elementary democratic principles’. It is therefore that these shifting border-
lands on the edges of the political imaginations of European policymakers are 
true heterotopic spaces as they forcefully undermine democratic principles of 
which the EU stands strong. These spaces of resistance force the EU to show 
its power, to measure the people who enter. They are both the excess of the 
imagined ideal and the proof of a true heterotopia. As such Heterotopias are 
disturbing places for the Brussels dream of shared prosperity, democracy and 
well being for all. They ‘unstitch, undermine and transform utopias’ (Johnson, 
2006, 85). They produce ‘impossible’ or ‘unthinkable’ spaces and do not prom-
ise solutions, but highlight the inverted norm. They are the spatial embodi-
ment of the impossibility of a smooth common European space. 
5.4 HETEROTOPIC DISCIPLINES
Next to the heterogeneous examples of Cyprus and Belarus, I would like to make a 
note on a third and different example of heterotopias. In a time where the technocratic 
policies of the European Union seems increasingly lacking a meaningful and inclu-
sive social agenda, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have taken the difficult 
but important task in sketching alternative visions of a more social Europe. Broader 
societal questions and the option of true societal and geopolitical alternatives have 
been raised by influential philosophers in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial 
crisis and mainly focuses on the neo-liberal ideology behind the European policies 
(among them Slavoj Zizek, Alain Badiou, Zygmunt Bauman and Peter Sloterdijk most 
of them inspired by the work of Foucault). The name of these thinkers appeared fre-
quently in the radical geographical journal Antipode (see for example van Houtum 
and Boedeltje, 2009). These scholars to some extent represent the theoretical hetero-
topias (theoretical activism) undermining the dominant theoretical discourse. 
 With the broader support of these influential thinkers, contemporary political 
geography has delivered some valuable contributions in which the dividing and ex-
clusive tendencies of technocratic policies like the ENP have been linked to the domi-
nating neo-liberal ideology. In 2006, Ray Hudson (2006, 385) expressed the continuing 
need to question neo-liberalism ‘in order to address these issues of inequality and to 
grasp the ‘‘why’’ and not just the how, what and where of capitalist economic geog-
raphies’. The question of why geography needs critical thinkers is in the first place 
given in by Hudson’s call to acknowledge the domination of neo-liberalism over the 
last two decades. In his view capital domination has both considerably intensified 
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and increased. Noel Castree (2010, 207) emphasized this by remarking that ‘capital-
ism will morph and adapt as it has always done: the operating hardware will remain 
intact, even as the all-important details will alter quite profoundly’. He quite rightly 
asks at what cost this will be? Nonetheless, these critical question are in sharp con-
trast to what is debated today among most intellectuals as well as policy-makers fo-
cusing on deregulation, control, bureaucracy, efficiency and technocratic governance. 
As this dissertation has made clear, the EU seems increasingly faced with the con-
temporary difficulties of neo-liberalism as the questioning of the ENP emphasized. 
Economic problems, xenophobia, populism, renewed nationalism, border manage-
ment, exclusion are among the problems that have also been recognised by scholars. 
Castree (2010, 207) remarks that critical Europeans ‘have not just to hope for, but work 
vigorously towards, a future that can set capitalism on a path of much greater social 
and environmental justice.’ 
In a recent television lecture broadcasted on Dutch television philosopher Slavoj 
Zizek expressed that neither the market nor political institutions can and will be capa-
ble of providing durable solutions for more solidarity in Europe. The big dilemma ac-
cording to him is situated in the ideas of Francis Fukuyama as set out in his early 1990s 
book ‘The End of History’. His ideas were centred on the idea that with the rise of social 
democratic capitalism (after the collapse of Communism) a particular socio-political 
form remained as the only realistic option: ‘The dream of global capitalism with a hu-
man face’. However, EU policies need less and less democracy to work efficiently as the 
ENP revealed. Technocratic politics based on regulation, laws, control and evaluation is 
increasingly a de-politicized ‘empty spectacle’ with experts who take distinct economic 
measures. Zizek sees this as the systematic dismantling of the social political system of 
the state. Here freedom is not suspended, but explained in a different way where all the 
small individual freedoms are available (consumerism, hedonism, making fun) but in 
the background the fundamental freedom and equality is slowly reduced. 
Hence, when following this rather pessimistic trend, this renewed form of capi-
talism in Europe could be a foreground of what might come. From this perspective 
the critique of critical geopoliticians on the neo-liberal European values and the geo-
political narrative based on regulations, measures, conditionality and socialization 
can be read as a renewed call that opts to think of alternatives for neo-liberalism in 
times where the need for new ideas is exemplified by neighbouring states who are 
given the rather bleak choice between liberal democracy and barbarism. The theoreti-
cal directions are not particular easy or paved, but the desire to come up with true 
transformative and progressive alternatives that can counter the prevailed hegemonic 
visions remains daunting and necessary. In his last public speech before his death, 
historian Tony Judt gathered all his remaining energy to say some intriguing words 
on ‘what is living and what is dead in social democracy’: 
‘The task of social democracy now is to remember not only what was achieved 
but the consequences of the failure to achieve it. The consequences of failure to 
recall what happened to liberal society when it enters the stage of uncertainty and 
insecurity. Social democracy, public goods, collective welfare, state provision of the 
services we today inadequately provide privately. They are not the perfect answer. 
‘What we have learned from the 20th century that the perfect answers are 
frighteningly imperfect. But my feeling, my sense of social democracy as a 
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possible language, a possible alternative, a possible way to begin to talk publi-
cally about our collective goals is all we have. We should be angrier than we 
are, much angrier than we are about what we have lost rhetorically, collec-
tively, ethically in the three decades that we moved away from the astonishing 
achievements of the previous 100 years. 
‘There is something to return to, something worth fighting for, something 
worth collectively inspiring to. I leave you with that thought. Thank you.’  
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6 Conclusion: of Other 
European Spaces 
Now that the analysis of a transitional European geopolitics nearly has come to an 
end I have to return to the important question I posed in the research objective: Can 
the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU live up to its promise of contribut-
ing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe? In the course of formulating an 
answer I have gone through a critical scrutiny of several interrelated themes. These 
themes have been constructed around a distinct geopolitical framework, which can 
be seen as a strategic geopolitical response by the EU in order to deal with the new 
situation following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The changing 
circumstances have led to new challenges and opportunities based on two geopo-
litical rationales: 1) to cope with its new external borders and neighbours, and 2) to 
find a solution for a further enlargement problem, whereby both rationales attempt 
to avoid potentially damaging consequences of stability and development, and new 
inducements for multilevel cooperation are seen as necessary in order to ‘include’ 
the neighbouring states and create a prosperous and stable ‘ring of friends’. The new 
challenges and opportunities are according to the EU centred on three P’s: Proximity, 
Prosperity and Poverty, whereby proximity relates to the geographical dimension 
of historical and relational closeness to the EU and Prosperity and Poverty relate to 
developmental issues and stability to prevent political and economic destabilisation 
and possible political confrontation. In addition, these policies are contextualized 
in various Action Plans. The various Action plans will be budgeted through the 
European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI).
In the sizeable collection of European Union discourse as found in various docu-
ments, papers and communication on the ENP the language contains diplomatic 
narratives built on internal transformation and ‘Europeanization’. ‘Europeanization’ 
of the continents periphery is part of the common foreign policy rationale of the ENP 
and can be seen as a normative process of sharing European norms and values (this 
must be understood in terms of ‘the rule of law, good governance, the respect for hu-
man rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, 
the principles of market economy and sustainable socio-economic development). 
‘Europeanization’ is made concrete in the ENP through policies of conditionality 
and socialization. Conditionality is a rewarding system based on rational institution-
alism, whereby the level of integration depends on the performances of the partner 
states. Socialization is based on a system of social learning and assistance in the 
field of civil society, education, culture and governance. This process of expanding 
‘Europeanization’ beyond the EU borders is according to the EU based on the geo-
politics of ‘soft-power’ that the EU applies as a strategic instrument, but sometimes 
collides with internal contradictory regional and historic interests of the different 
member states. 
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In broader geopolitical terms the EU’s geopolitical intention can be understood 
as a reaction to the enlargement process, whereby its weakening power towards the 
outer circles of its peripheries forced the centre to obtain an active agenda to expand 
its core based model of ‘Europeanization’. The circles constructed through a hierarchy 
of categories of ‘old’ and ‘new’ accession, pre-accession, candidate, non-candidate and 
non-Europe represent a system of multilateral and bilateral relations and institutions 
in which the EU can be conceptualized as geopolitical ‘subject’ instead of ‘agent’ or 
‘actor’.  
The process of ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ is defined through ordering, in which the 
EU is thus in a continuous process of ordering its geopolitical space through defining 
itself, its neighbours and its complex multilateral and bilateral relations emphasizing 
a post-national connotation of Europe. The problem however, is that the EU’s ‘geo-
political subjectivity’ is putting forth geopolitical discourses that are competing and 
hardly coherent. This is emphasized by the fact that the ENP on the one hand allows 
for securitisation, which means the prevention of political and economic destabilisa-
tion leading to new forms of exclusion and border management and on the other hand 
a politics of assistance, cooperation and dialogue (creating new forms of inclusion).  
In order to analyse this paradox of simultaneous processes of inclusion and ex-
clusion I made an effort to investigate the broader geopolitical field within the prac-
tice of geography that has paved the path for a critical geopolitical framework of 
analysis and opened up a whole new way of looking critically at spatial problems. 
I explained how critical geopolitics could function as a method that is able to cope 
with the changing geopolitical circumstances in the 21st century Europe. By look-
ing with the critical geopolitical eye at the different policy documents, publications 
and observations, I have tried to argue that the ideal version of Europe carries the 
characteristics of utopia as exemplified in the classic fictional state-utopias. In what 
I have called the construction of EU-topia, the EU has with the introduction of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) made careful steps in which these ideals 
increasingly inform contemporary political actions. The implications of the overlap 
between utopian ideals and political actions have resulted in vague and unclear ter-
ritorial claims and practices, Action Plans and policies, sometimes intervened or over-
ruled by power-politics of individual member-states and in many cases ignoring the 
needs of the complicated realities of everyday life. 
I have made an effort to outline that a territorial ideal version of Europe fits un-
easy with the everyday life of the people and communities in Europe. The increasing 
belief in a makeable Europe among EU policy makers has far-reaching and complex 
implications on different levels. In these remote transit places the distinction is made 
between European citizens and non – or less – European neighbours. Under the flag 
of shared prosperity, the construction of the neighbourhood promotes the projection 
of an idealized common future with neighbours sharing everything but European 
institutions. If this silent power strategy may have worked well with the EU candidate 
states in the past it becomes clear that it did not work as well with the neighbouring 
states. For those people and communities who can not become ‘fully European’, will 
always be subjected to shifting policies of which they have no democratic influence, 
hard border management and other excluding reminders that they are not part of the 
desired version of a EU-topia.
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In a way to grasp the impacts of the EU's notion of security and citizenship to-
wards wider Europe and how they are reflected in everyday realities in the areas 
concerned, I have introduced Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopias in order to 
theorize the gap between the perceived desired EU-topia and the contradicting local 
realities. Distinct contradictions resist the utopian image. Through the critical scruti-
ny of Belarus and Cyprus I have tried to outline that distinct local realties disturb and 
resist the hegemonic visions of policy makers. As such, a bounded economic political 
Europe with a fixed identity seems to collapse in the contradictory and confusing 
geographies of Europe’s borderlands. Foucault himself was well aware of the impor-
tance of heterotopias. The reason he wrote On Other Spaces in 1967 was because of his 
criticism on the (static) meaning of space (after all the article was written for a confer-
ence on architecture). His article has broadened the understanding that heterotopias 
as real and imagined spaces represent space as social construction. Foucault foresees 
a society with many heterotopias, not only for the affirmation of difference, but also 
as a way to escape repression, stating metaphorically that if we take the ship as the 
utmost heterotopia, a society without ships ‘dreams dry up, espionage takes the place 
of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates’. 
So can I say that the ambiguous geopolitical agenda of the EU has lived up to its 
promise of contributing to a more democratic, safe and social Europe? After I per-
sonally experienced the consequences of this during my fieldwork for the FP5 and 
FP6 projects on Cyprus and the Canary Islands (projects supported by the European 
Commission under the Fifth and Sixth Framework Programme that examined op-
portunities and constraints to local/regional cross-border co-operation along the EU 
external border) I can say that it is difficult to share the claims in which the European 
Union decides what Europe is - or is not – and what makes a European citizen with 
distinct rights and privileges. The duality and confusion between ‘Europe’ as script-
ed by the homogeneous political imaginations of EU policy makers and the ‘Other 
Europe’ of local and often complex realities and everyday lives has resulted in a 
discontented geopolitics that is increasingly problematic.
In the spirit of an alternative geopolitics of Europe I would like to suggest that the 
common ideal of a more social and democratic Europe might after all be a Europe 
that as an open idea(l) is capable of representing all different lives equally. The ques-
tion is how far this is universally translatable without excluding people. The stories 
of dissidents, teachers, immigrants, workers and mothers do matter in politics. These 
voices deserve an equal representation in policies, practices and plans. As the Cyprus 
example revealed, different ways of voicing the fieldwork results can make a differ-
ence. But also different sources outside academia deserve a more proper place within 
the search for a more grounded geopolitics. Although one should be careful with the 
authenticity and reliability of the sources, the current multimedia landscape proves 
to be a fruitful platform for people to share their lives. Alternative geopolitical imagi-
nations should incorporate local sensitivities, complex lives and historical narratives 
that provide a different but inclusive European geopolitics. Next to that we have to 
find a new way of dealing with the transitions and difficulties that come along with 
increasing globalisation, communication and neo-liberalism. 
As I am writing this conclusion, the current Left in Europe is struggling in finding 
answers to these transitions. These transitions are an easy target for right-wing politi-
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cians to turn them into fear and anxiety that divides instead of unites. The current 
right-wing mobilisation in Europe indicates that we have to find new ways of organ-
ising Europe, not via neo-liberal logic that defines neighbouring states according to 
their market potentials and security risks, but by redefining politics altogether. What 
is very much alive is the current gap between generalizing politicians and left-alone 
citizens. Their right-wing vote is very much a protest vote, as they want to be taken 
serious. For many people (at least in the Netherlands) the EU represents an elite or-
ganisation that takes their money and opens the borders for migrants. How unjust 
this perception might be, it represents the current discontent of European geopolitics 
and the difficulties of coping with changing circumstances. Closing the gap between 
citizens and politicians must involve an accurate and empathic response from politi-
cians to citizens’ concerns in which expectations and outcomes are to some extent 
logically sequenced. On the supranational European level these ambitions seem hard 
to realize. It is therefore of importance to downgrade the ambitions of a state-centred 
European Union with neighbours, identity and a foreign policy. These makeable am-
bitions only strengthen the current discontent and xenophobic tendencies, as they do 
not communicate on the level of citizens. 
 Why is it so difficult to imagine genuine alternatives to hegemonic geopolitical 
models? We can think of the dominance of institutional interests of those engaged 
resulting in a West-centred way of seeing the world. Thus Western-European solu-
tions are promoted, even when these solutions are actually coming under increasing 
debate in the West itself as the economic crisis has lead to diminished faith in the 
market, and some also signal a crisis in democracy in the West. The same goes for the 
centrality of the state, which has steadily decentralized over the past half century but 
which continues to be promoted. 
Next to that, the dominance of the neoliberal discourse should not be underes-
timated. The thing about a hegemonic discourse is that when you are part of it, it is 
difficult to see it. It has come to define what is ‘normal’. Even those who do may be 
reluctant to do so openly, as challenging the dominant way of thinking is not easy. 
It may be that some people in fact have different aims but strive to present them in 
terms of the politically correct discourse of the time. 
Another possibility of why people shy away from thinking about real alterna-
tives is interest. People and organizations have become invested in the worldview 
that they promote, and to question it would mean to lose face and be shaken their 
own identity. In addition, people are understandably attached to the security of their 
jobs and organizations. What these examples indicate is that these vision on the cur-
rent asymmetric situation in Europe all ‘help to nurture a reworking of the types of 
conceptual frameworks, methodologies and empirical examples that have previously 
delimited critical interrogations of geopolitics’ (Jones and Sage, 2010, 2). 
In order to cope with these complexities, an important role for the EU would be 
to guard the values of solidarity, justice and democracy not by drafting new policies, 
external borders and pretending to be a state, but by carrying these values on the 
level of discourse, in the background as an institution that protects Europe from hard 
border management, xenophobia and wild excesses of neo-liberalism. I am convinced 
that citizens can relate to this, only if they can relate to their everyday lives and to the 
countries they live in. The responsibility lies with the citizens as well. They are not 
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victims or people who need to be freed. It is the responsibility of the people of Europe 
to reinvent the social-democratic heritage of our parents in new ways that appeal to 
the changing and confusing geopolitics of our time. What comes to my mind is the 
work of Laura Burkhalter who together with Manuel Castells is founder of the insti-
tute for bionomic urbanism in Los Angeles. The aims of the IBU think tank is creating 
experimental catalyst projects in areas of social, economic and environmental need 
(for example the establishment of the U.S. largest inner city organic farm, promoting 
multiple aspects of bionomic urbanism and a consciousness for sustainability within 
the local and extended community. In addition, educational programs including a 
think-tank and host roundtable discussions, symposiums and presentation of the 
research and theories being developed by IBU and subsequent affiliated programs. 
These projects serve as a bottom up approach to changing the current destructive 
development patterns. They shall also serve as educational examples, informing the 
public as well as policy makers and planners about the sustainable alternatives of 
urban politics.
 I became fascinated by her work and her alternative ideas of community, envi-
ronment and the city. In her work the sense of community is becoming much more 
important. Certainly after the economic crisis hit California very hard, people now 
depend more on each other than before. Being asked by a journalist if the end of 
the gold rush also meant the end of the American dream she answered: ‘I think the 
American dream is much larger than that. It is just one part of the American Dream. 
The American dream has to do with self-expression and freedom. It has been caught 
up in this kind of wanna-have materialistic aspect of it. I think the Americans are 
very optimistic people, and they will get back up, so I think freedom is now redefined 
in a way that it is less dependent on the capitalistic system, and I truly think that this 
is the essence of the American dream. One thing about Americans is that they are 
very flexible cause people change their lives all the time here. It’s kind of the way it 
is like “Oh its over….what’s next: Let’s start over!” ’  
Even though her ideas are contextualized in Los Angeles, they can nonetheless 
serve as a testing ground for similar projects and ideas on the other side of the Atlantic 
who face similar problems and challenges and the similar effects of the economic cri-
sis. Next to that, I believe the American dream not so much differs from the European 
idea as posed by Wim Wenders (the subjective parameters of self-expression and crea-
tive freedom). Laura Burkhalter’s dedication, for me, proved that developing theory 
and experimental and project based applications based on personal experiences can 
contribute to sustainable alternatives. Therefore, even though this thesis has now 
come to an end I will not conclude this manuscript as such. Instead, the experience 
of research and writing brought a change I could not foresee. Therefore, it might be 
better to speak of a new beginning in which I will dedicate my future work even more 
to the level of personal experience that fosters change and movement.  
 In the meanwhile Europe will be there, in its heterogeneity in the hermitages of 
Saint Petersburg and the nice coffee houses of North Cyprus, but also where a former 
custom building on the Belgian-Dutch border now hosts a restaurant where you can 
pay with the same money, where Polish trucks carry German trailers, and where you 
can work in Finland and live in Amsterdam. All these things are magnificent and 
enjoyable only if you can return to the source of where it all starts, a place where you 
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can relate to, feel safe and at home, wherever this may be. This is both the beginning 
and end of Europe.  
6.1 FUTURE RESEARCH AND THE ONGOING NEED FOR 
CRITICAL VOICES 
From this urgent context future research on EU critical geopolitics should take into 
account that cooperation between states united in an organisation like the EU certain-
ly has advantages. Many benefit from cooperation and cooperation in itself implies 
a form of solidarity and collective responsibility in tackling global problems and re-
quires no membership, prescribed values or external borders. It should also take into 
account that a more local geopolitics (as voiced by the critical geographers in this dis-
sertation) that is able to give voice to the complexities of local realities is able to resist 
the problematic political imaginations that increasingly inform political action. From 
this perspective alternative and transformative geopolitical research should focus on 
how the European Union as a truly democratic institution that on an equal basis of-
fers cooperation and dialogue to those countries alongside the European Union, can 
and should be able to democratise itself. The first and foremost task in this is making 
the clear distinction between Europe and the European Union that leaves aside stra-
tegic interests packed up in unrealistic imaginations of universal values and a true 
and good Europe. In addition, giving voices of resistance a proper place in research 
might unfold that indeed too much is claimed for Europe. The complex realities of a 
more local version of Europe might reveal that Europe is always more than what is 
inevitably claimed. There are more heterotopias to prove that Europe’s reality never 
really is what it seems to be.  The bordering of Europe in name of this or that has the 
destructive and inevitable outcome that something is excluded which is also Europe. 
Returning to Foucault, who valued the need for heterotopias to escape from repres-
siveness and to celebrate difference, we so far have seen that they indeed recall con-
tradiction and undermine authority in the shifting territorial spaces of Europe/EU. 
After 6 years ENP the conclusion might be drawn that the desire of Europeanization 
of a ring of neighbours has turned out to be problematic in its practical workout and 
its relation amongst its neighbours. From this perspective a more local geopolitical 
future research might indeed discover that the European neighbourhood is a het-
erotopic space and able to open up the affirmation of contradiction and resistance, 
the possibility to escape from dull sameness and repressive economical and political 
ideals. In this discussion critical geopolitics and in particular feminist geopolitics 
continue to play a central role. Gail Lewis (2006, 101) calls for a renewed attention 
to history (by taking into account earlier connotation of ‘global interconnection’, ‘in-
equality’ and ‘epistemological privilege’) and a re-conceptualization of scale (which 
takes into account the unique and shifting relation between people and place as we 
have seen in the examples of Belarus and Cyprus). It is these more local spaces below 
the hegemonic normative policy frameworks that require ongoing and critical study-
ing in order to increase a ‘nuanced’ awareness of society and spaces and the sweeping 
effects of and resistance to political actions. Jennifer Fluri, 2009, 264) comes to the 
same conclusions in which she mentions the recent feminist political geographers’ 
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request for ‘scalar analyses of political geography, which include local politics as part 
of rather than separate from geopolitical analyses’. As we have learned from the work 
of Gerard O’Tuathail a more local approach is necessary to capture the consequences 
and challenges of the transition of European geopolitics in the 21st century. Only a 
more heterogeneous understanding of geopolitics is able to reinvent the valuable 
concepts of unity and solidarity that undermine the rigid lines that continue to divide 
between migrant/stranger/European. 
"It is not by confining one's neighbour that one is
convinced of one's own sanity”.
Dostoievsky, in his Diary of a writer
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concept of the European Union’s 
external borders in the 21st century 
and the geopolitical and symbolic 
implications that are taking place on 
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